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A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure
Keith N. Hylton * and Vikramaditya Khanna* *

We provide an additionaljustificationfor the pro-defendant
bias in Anglo-American criminalprocedurethat supplements the most commonly forwarded justifications to date.
The most commonly forwarded rationalefor the prodefendant bias is that the costs of false convictions-specifically, the sanctioningand deterrence costs associatedwith
the erroneousimposition of criminalsanctions-aregreater
than the costs of false acquittals. We argue that this rationale
provides at best a partialjustificationfor the extent of prodefendant proceduralrules. Under our justification,prodefendant protectionsserve primarily as constraintson the
costs associatedwith rent seeking in the law enforcement
process. The theory developed here explains key institutional
features of Anglo-American criminalprocedureand provides
a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also
corroboratedby empiricalevidence on corruptionfrom several countries.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many people who study Anglo-American criminal law the procedural protections offered to defendants are a bit of a puzzle. At the
simplest level, these protections permit some factually guilty defen• Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School;
Ph.D. (Economics), M.I.T. Email: knhylton@bu.edu.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; S.J.D., Harvard Law
School. Email: vskhanna@umich.edu.
© 2007 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0-226-64597-5/2007/0015-0004$10.00
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dants to escape conviction, which increases the incentives of wrongdoers to commit crimes. I This seems odd given that criminal wrongs
are the most serious wrongs in society and hence the ones we should
most wish to reduce.2 What explains the willingness of Anglo-American
law to permit wrongdoers to escape conviction and thereby potentially increase the crime rate?
Commentators have offered a variety of justifications for "prodefendant" procedural protections. 3 The most commonly-forwarded
justification is that in the criminal process we should be more concerned about the social costs generated by a false conviction than the
social costs generated by a false acquittal. 4 According to this view,
false convictions are especially worrisome because they involve the
state's denial of liberty to an innocent individual, the infliction of irreparable harm to an individual's reputation, and weaken the moral
'See, for example, Raymond A. Atkins and Paul H. Rubin, Effects of CriminalProcedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46
JL Econ 157 (2003) (finding Miranda may have increased total crime rates by eleven
percent and violent crimes rates by thirty-three percent); Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty
& The "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from
FalseConfessions, 22 Harv J L & Pub Policy 523 n 30 (1999); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's
Social Costs:An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 NWU L Rev 387, 451 (1996) (finding after Miranda criminal suspects are less willing to confess to their crimes). But see,
John J. Donohue, III,
Did Miranda Diminish PoliceEffectiveness, 50 Stan L Rev (1998)
(dissecting the statistical analyses in Cassell's work and criticizing the use of statistics
in measuring the import of Court decisions).
2 See S.E. Marshall and R.A. Duff, Criminalizationand Sharing Wrongs, 11 Can J L
& Juris 7 (1998) (noting that the term "criminal" indicates a serious condemnation of
an activity or action); Susan Estrick, Rape, 95 Yale L J 1087, 1183 (1986) (noting that
"conduct is labeled 'criminal' in order to announce to society that these actions are not
to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims
of The Criminal Law, 23 L & Contemp Probs 401, 404-05 (stating that "[w]hat distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction.., is the judgement of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition"). See also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the DisappearingTort/Crime
Distinctionin American Law, 71 BU L Rev 193, 194 (1991) (noting that "the factor that
most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a system of moral education and
socialization ...[a]s a result, the criminal law often and necessarily displays a deliberate disdain for the utility of the criminalized conduct to the defendant"); Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, in Blame and Punishment: Essays in the Criminal Law 87
(Macmillan 1987) (concluding that "Criminal conviction charges a moral fault ......
Herbert Packer, The Limits of the CriminalSanction (Stanford 1968).
3 See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis 2d 1997)
(discussing various pro-defendant biases and their justifications); Donald J. Boudreaux
and Adam C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History, 33 San Diego L Rev 79 (1996); Randolph N. Jonakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for JudicialAnalysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L Rev 67, 68
(arguing that pro-defendant evidence rules are defensible as they promote justice).
4 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 604-05 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
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force or authority with which the criminal law speaks.' In In Re Winship, the Supreme Court adopted this position as the primary rationale for viewing the high standard of proof used in criminal trials as
constitutionally mandated. 6 We will refer to this position as the "traditional error cost justification!'
However, the traditional error cost justification does not, we argue, provide a complete explanation for pro-defendant procedural
protections. In this paper we provide and develop another justification for the procedural protections: to constrain the costs associated
with abuses of prosecutorial or punishment authority (or rent seeking more broadly). We call this a public choice theory of criminal procedure.7 Moreover, we argue that this paper's theory, together with the
traditional error cost justification, provides a superior explanation for
pro-defendant procedural protections than does the error cost justification standing alone.
To be sure, many courts and commentators have made the point
that criminal procedural protections constrain the potential for abuse
by government agents. 8 However, the key contributions of this paper
are (1) the development and elaboration of this observation in terms
of an economic framework, (2) the use of this observation, as part of
5 See In Re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-64 (1970) (Brennan) ("The accused during a
criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for

commission of a crime when there is a reasonable doubt about his guilt ....

Moreover,

use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted."), 372-74 (Harlan concurring) (noting
that the reasonable doubt standard is used in criminal trials because society views false
convictions as being far worse than false acquittals largely due to liberty and reputation costs). See also Donald A. Dripps, People v Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the CriminalJustice System: Relevant But PrejudicialExculpatory Evidence: RationalityVersus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S Cal L Rev
1389, 1418 (1996) (noting that "[the reasonable doubt standard] strikes the balance
very much in favor of [increasing] false acquittals]" as opposed to false convictions);
Bruce H. Kobayashi and John R. Lott, Jr., Low-Probability-High-Penalty Enforcement
Strategies and the Efficient Operationof the Plea-BargainingSystem, 12 Intl Rev L &
Econ 69 (1992) (analyzing the costs of false convictions).
6 See In Re Winship, 397 US at 364.
7 In some respects the theory in this paper builds on David Friedman's analysis of
punishments, see David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J Polit Econ 259 (1999).
8 See for example, Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern
CriminalProcedure114-127 (West 8th ed 1994); Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W Scott,
Jr., CriminalLaw 97-100 (West 2d ed 1986); Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold Israel, and Nancy
JKing, CriminalProcedure25-39 (West 3d ed 2000); Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 447
(1970).
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that framework, to form the basis of a positive theory of the case law
and conventions of criminal procedure, and (3) an empirical analysis
showing that procedural protections dampen corruption, a byproduct
of rent-seeking. In summary, the theory we develop provides a better
explanation than the traditional story (standing alone) for the existence and specific form of key rules and institutional features: the
reasonable-doubt and double-jeopardy rules, restrictions on excessive
and retroactive punishments, and features of the right to a jury, such
as the unanimity requirement and peremptory challenges.
We start with the claim that procedural protections make it more
costly for self-interested actors, whether individuals or government
enforcement agents, to use the criminal process to obtain their desired
ends; which in turn saves resources and enhances deterrence. Absent
some constraint, prosecutors and government agents would use the
criminal process to benefit themselves or their constituents. History
provides a number of examples of this. Procedural protections impose constraints and make the criminal process more costly to use,
providing enforcement agents and those who would lobby them with
a disincentive to use it for selfish ends. This saves resources that otherwise would be eaten up by lobbying and makes it more difficult for
a variety of forms of corruption to flourish.9 In addition, procedural
protections are likely to enhance deterrence. The reason is that when
it is easy to enforce the law selectively, enforcement agents will come
under pressure to sacrifice deterrence objectives in favor of other
goals for which people lobby.
Part II provides a description of some core criminal procedural protections-primarily the reasonable-doubt and double jeopardy rules.
Part III inquires into the traditional rationales for these protections.
Part IV presents the public choice rationale for procedural protections. In this part we explain the incentives for and various types of
wealth extraction in the law enforcement process. Part V discusses
the costs of rent seeking (or abuses of prosecutorial or punishment
authority) in the criminal law enforcement process.
Part VI examines methods of constraining self-interested prosecutors, which include procedural protections and restrictions on penalties. In this part we present theories of the core functions of prodefendant protections. We argue that their core function is to constrain
9 See, for example, Gordon Tullock, ed, The Economics of Special Privilege and
Rent Seeking 96 (Kluwer 1989); Charles K. Rowley, et al, eds, The PoliticalEconomy
of Rent-Seeking 465-78, (Kluwer 1988).
We should note at the outset that we do not suggest that the pro-defendant criminal
procedures eliminate rent-seeking or that these procedures are not dynamic. Rent-seeking
may well adjust to new political, social, and economic realities and the law can be expected
to respond to that. Focusing on rent-seeking simply further highlights this point.
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the set of contractible bribes between a prosecutor and another party
We also argue that the reasonable-doubt and double jeopardy rules
function as complements in suppressing corruption in enforcement.
This works for both decisions to enforce and not to enforce the law.
Lastly, the unanimity rule regarding jury convictions and the original
function of peremptory challenges are both explained as features designed to dampen rent seeking in enforcement.
Part VII applies the core theories developed in Part VI to provide a
positive theory of the case law on procedural protections. Part VIII then
provides empirical evidence that pro-defendant protections dampen
corruption.
Thus, our theory, taken together with the error cost account, provides a better explanation of the traditional doctrines of criminal procedure. Moreover, one of the advantages of focusing on rent seeking is
that rent seeking occurs in certain institutional and political contexts.
Thus, when that context changes and the potential for rent seeking
evolves, so might the law. Indeed, we suggest that certain doctrines
have developed over the last century (e.g., entrapment) in ways that
mirror concerns with rent seeking in the context of the increasing
criminalization of conduct.
II. SOME CORE PRO-DEFENDANT
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS

CRIMINAL

There is a vast panoply of procedural protections attached to the criminal process in the U.S. To focus our analysis we hone in on core protections that impose a significant pro-defendant bias in the criminal
law process, by reducing either the probability of conviction or the
severity of punishment.' 0 In particular, we focus on the reasonabledoubt standard of proof and double jeopardy protections.
The reasonable-doubt standard requires that the moving party (i.e.,
10Rules that indirectly impose a bias by restricting the type of evidence that can be
presented, such as the exclusionary rule or the right to silence, do not fall within our
definition of core protections. This is because their impact on the probability of conviction is not as direct as the reasonable doubt standard and also because they do not
have the same kind of historical pedigree that the reasonable doubt standard has. See
Lawrence H. Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus:EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
Harv L Rev 592, 607 (1985) (noting that "[EJxclusionary rule cases ... are today treated
as occasion for the assessment of the marginal deterrent effects of excluding particular categories of evidence"). Also note that it might be easier for police and other government agencies to satisfy some parts of the Fourth Amendment (for example, giving
a Miranda warning) as compared to satisfying the reasonable doubt standard. See
Charles Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,84 Cornell L Rev 109 (1998) (advocating a return
to the "original" vision of Miranda).However, much of the analysis in the text can be
applied to the "non-core" protections as well.
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the prosecution) prove that the defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the criminal offense(s) with which he is charged."I Although the reasonable-doubt formulation seems to have first appeared
in 1798,12 the notion that the standard of proof in criminal trials should
favor defendants has ancient origins. Blackstone, in his description of
the criminal process, noted that "all presumptive evidence of felony
should be admitted cautiously: for the law holds, that it is better that
ten guilty persons escape, than one innocent suffer."'13 Coke, considerably earlier, said that "the evidence against a prisoner should be
so manifest, as it could not be contradicted.' ' 4 In 1970, the Supreme
Court "constitutionalized" this norm by holding in In Re Winship
that the due process clause protects the defendant against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 5
The reasonable-doubt standard stands in contrast to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, used most frequently in noncriminal cases.' 6 It requires that the moving party prove that the defendant is liable on the preponderance of the evidence or, put simply,
is more likely liable than not. 17 Sometimes the preponderance rule is
assumed to require that the decision-maker be 51 percent certain
that the defendant is liable before finding against him, whereas the
reasonable doubt standard is assumed to require that the decisionmaker be somewhere in the range of 90 percent to 95 percent certain
before convicting the defendant. 8
1 See In Re

Winship, 397 US at 361.

'2 See C. McCormick, Evidence § 341 at 576-78 (West 1992).
13 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 358.
14 Id at 349-50.
1- See In Re Winship, 397 US at 364.
16 See Concrete Pipe and Products of California,Inc v Construction Laborer'sPension Trust for Southern California,508 US 602, 622 (1993) (noting that preponderance
of the evidence is the "most common standard in the civil law"); Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000) (noting that the preponderance of the evidence standard can be
used for sentencing as long as the sentence is not more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict).
11See US v Mandanici,205 F3d 519, 532 (2d Cir 2000) (Kearse concurring) (noting
that "a preponderance means more likely than not").
18See Ethyl Corp v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 28 n 58 (DC Cir 1976) (stating that "It may be that
the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of criminal law demands 95% certainty [internal cites omitted]. But.. . , a preponderance of the evidence demands only 51% certainty"); Brown v Bowen, 847 F2d 342,345-46 (7th Cir 1988) (suggesting that certainty of
90 percent or more is sufficient to meet the reasonable doubt standard). There is yet another standard of proof that might be used in some instances. The clear and convincing evidence standard is used in some non-criminal contexts often as a method of determining if greater-than-compensatory damages should be awarded in a particular case. See
id at 346. This standard occupies an intermediate position between the preponderance
and the reasonable doubt standards. See, for example, Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477
US 242,271 (1986); Cornell v Nix, 119 F3d (8th Cir 1997). Although these three standards
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Another procedural protection is the prohibition against Double
Jeopardy, which stems from the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The 5th Amendment states "nor shall any person be subject
9
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb".1 In
many respects this protection is similar to the doctrines of Res Judi2
cata and Collateral Estoppel that are found in non-criminal cases . 0
However, there are some differences. In particular, one that has garnered much attention is the rule, unique to criminal proceedings, that
normally prohibits prosecutorial appeals of initial trial acquittals, but
permits defense appeals of initial trial convictions. 2'
Other core protections that are relevant in the criminal context are
the right to a jury trial, the ex post facto punishment rule,- and the
excessive punishments prohibition. 24 This does not exhaust the list
of protections that impose a pro-defendant bias, but the crucial point
for now is that many criminal procedural rules appear biased in favor
of the defense. What justifies this bias?
are sufficient for purposes of our analysis it is worth noting that in the past there have been
other standards. In fact, there was at one time a standard even higher than the reasonable
doubt standard. See Anthony M. Morano, A Reexaminationof the Development of the
Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 BU L Rev 507, 511-19 (1975) (arguing that prior to the articulation of the reasonable doubt standard, a higher standard existed that required proof
beyond any doubt). Indeed, there is, in theory a continuum of standards of proof, but in
practice only three. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, CorporateCriminalLiability: What
PurposeDoes It Serve?, 109 Harv L Rev 1477,1516 n 210; See also McCormick, Evidence
at 378 (cited in note 12). See also, Sullivan v LTV Aerospace and Defense Co, 82 F3d 1251,
1260 (2d Cir 1996) (noting that "[t]he familiar burden of proof standards occur along a continuum with 'preponderance of the evidence' at one end and 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
at the other. The 'clear and convincing evidence' standard falls somewhere in between.").
'9 US Const Amend V.
20 See Robin W Sardegna, No Longer In Jeopardy: The Impact of Hudson v US on
the ConstitutionalValidity of Civil Monetary Penaltiesfor Violations of the Securities Laws under the Double Jeopardy Clause, 33 Val U L Rev 115, 117 (1998) (noting
that the civil procedure doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are similar to
prohibitions of the double jeopardy clause).
21 See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal Rights:
What PurposeDo They Serve?, 82 BU L Rev 341 (2002); United States v Ball, 163 US
662, 671 (1896); Joshua Steinglass, The Justice System in Jeopardy: The Prohibitionon
Government Appeals, 31 Ind L Rev 353 (1998); Kate Stith, The Rise of Legal Errorin
Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U
Chi L Rev 1 (1990); Peter Westen and Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy,1978 S Ct Econ Rev 81. In the non-criminal side the analogous doctrines (for example, Collateral Estoppel) do not present such asymmetry in appeal
rights. See Cooperv FederalReserve Bank of Richmond, 467 US 867, 874 (1984) (noting that if the requirements are met both res judicata and collateral estoppel are available to plaintiffs and defendants).
22 US Const Amend VI.
23 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3.
24 US Const Amend VIII.
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III. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE CORE CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS: THE REASONABLE-DOUBT
STANDARD
The reasonable-doubt standard is the quintessential case of a prodefendant protection. The traditional justification for it is that in the
criminal process we are more concerned with false convictions than
false acquittals and hence should prefer a pro-defendant bias.2 5 Elaborating, the Supreme Court in Winship identified three types of harm
associated with false convictions: loss of liberty,stigma, and dilution
of the moral force of the criminallaw.26
In this part, we briefly reconsider the evidence supporting the traditional error cost argument of Winship. In order to address the argument directly, we will translate the Court's analysis into terms that
can be identified as measurable or immeasurable. Specifically, we can
classify the costs of false convictions and false acquittals as sanctioning costs, deterrence costs, and disutility costs. 27 Sanctioning
costs are the social costs of punishment, which include the loss of
liberty and stigma effects recognized in Winship. Deterrence costs refer to part of what the Winship Court probably intended when describing the dilution in law's moral force caused by false convictions.
If the law punishes the innocent, then it weakens deterrence by giving people less incentive to comply and, similarly, if it fails to punish
the guilty, then it weakens deterrence for obvious reasons.2 8 Disutility
25 See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *358; see also In Re Winship, 397 US

at 372
(Harlan concurring).
26
See In Re Winship, 397 US at 363-64. Although the Court did not conduct an examination of false acquittal costs, those costs presumably consist only of the third
type of harm, dilution of the law's moral force.
27
1In theory one could consider the impact on the "expressive" effects of the law too.
The expressive effect of the law is the effect it has on behavior without threatening a
sanction. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va L
Rev 1649 (2000), Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J Legal Stud 585
(1998). However, the law's expressive effect is probably more closely connected to the
perceived legitimacy of the law-that is whether it is corrupt or easy to corruptrather than a particular trade off between types of errors. See Jason Mazzone, When
Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Capital,49 Syracuse L Rev 1039
(1999). The corruption concern is more closely tied to our rent-seeking/public choice
theory than the traditional error cost account and as such is not discussed in this section. We discuss the expressive effect as impacted by our theory in Part V.B.2.
21 On the deterrence cost, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Legal Error,
Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J L, Econ, & Org 99 (1989) (noting that
if a potential defendant will not be prosecuted whether or not he obeys the law, he "will
not obey the law, because there is a cost to obeying but no benefit (assuming, of course,
that there is a benefit in disobeying)"). On the issue of those who go unpunished, see
Don E. Scheid, Constructinga Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distributionof
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costs refer to the other part of what the Winship Court probably intended when describing the dilution in the law's moral force: the
disutility individuals suffer when they know that the law fails to punish the guilty or that it sometimes punishes the innocent. 29
Translating Winship into these terms, the Court has said in effect that the additional sanctioning, deterrence, and disutility costs
of moving from the reasonable-doubt to the preponderance standard
would outweigh the potential benefits. Is there empirical support for
this claim?
To state a rough empirical test of the traditional error cost argument requires us to set aside disutility costs, for the moment, and
focus only on the costs that are measurable: sanctioningand deterrence costs. We will come back to the immeasurable costs later in the
analysis. Assuming that convictions drop under the reasonable doubt
rule relative to the preponderance standard then we have fewer sanctioning costs. 3 0 Further, under the reasonable doubt rule we would

expect deterrence to worsen relative to the preponderance rule. 31 The
reasonable-doubtrule is thus preferable if the incremental sanctioning costs under the preponderancerule exceed the incremental
(under-) deterrencecosts under the reasonable-doubtrule.
Punishments, 10 Can J L & Juris 441, 455 (1997) (noting that "[pleople are willing to
obey the law themselves so long as they can reasonably assume that those who break
the law will not be able to do so with impunity, that they will not get away with it.").
29Suppose people gain utility from knowing that the criminal justice system is fair.
Then a system that has some parts perceived to be unfair will reduce the utility of those
people who obtain utility from knowing the system is fair. This is clearly a harm that
can be traced to any change that weakens the moral force of the criminal law.
30
This argument, and everything that follows it, assumes that the standard of proof
changes while the substantive legal rules remains the same. If the state were to change
the substantive rules in order to maintain the same level of convictions, the argument
in the text would clearly be invalid. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
31 In other words, we expect the incremental deterrence costs of a false acquittal
(Dfj to exceed the incremental deterrence costs of a false conviction (DC). As a theoretical matter, this is demonstrable. First, both are positive because increases in either
type of error reduce the difference in payoffs for complying and not complying with the
law, see, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination
of Liability,37 J L & Econ 1, 5 (1994). Second, Df. > Dc, as a theoretical matter because
in a well functioning enforcement system, enforcement efforts will tend to be targeted
at guilty actors. Given this, changes in false acquittal probabilities will far outweigh
changes in false conviction probabilities in terms of their influence on incentives. For
a formal analysis reaching the same conclusion, see Henrik Lando, The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter, SSRN
Working Paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=238334. Both
the argument here and Lando's model are easily reconcilable with Craswell and Calfee's
article on the deterrence effects of error; see Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and UncertainLegal Standards,2 J L, Econ, & Org 279 (1986).
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There are data that allow us to get a rough sense of whether this
condition holds. The most direct sources are studies by David Anderson, 32 and by John Donohue and Peter Siegelman. 33 If we use the sum
of losses due to injuries and property theft (including fraud) as a conservative definition of the aggregate harm from crime, Anderson's study
suggests the annual aggregate crime cost is $1,031 billion.34 If we
measure sanctioning costs by adding the opportunity costs of the inmate's time while locked up plus the costs of maintaining inmates in
prison, Anderson's study suggests that the annual sanctioning cost
35
for all convictions is $71 billion.
These numbers imply that the aggregate costs of crime, which can
32See David Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J L & Econ 611 (1999).
The sanctioning costs of the death penalty are not discussed here because of the small
number of executions each year. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna
Mehlhop Shepherd, Does CapitalPunishment Have a DeterrentEffect? NewEvidence
from Post-moratoriumPanel Data, 5 Am L & Econ Rev 344, 348 (2003) (providing a
table of the number of executions over the last 23 years which appear to be around forty
to fifty a year).
33 See John J Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programsin the Battle Against Crime,27 J Legal Stud 1 (1998).
34 See Anderson, 42 J L & Econ at 629 (cited in note 32) (providing a figure of $1,102
billion which represents the sum of "Risks to life and health," "Crime-induced production," and "Opportunity Costs" (for criminals and victims)). We have reduced this
amount by $71 billion, which represents the sanctioning costs associated with using
prison as a penalty as this is more appropriately accounted for as sanctioning costs for
our analysis. See note 37. The "risks to life and health" reflect the value of crimerelated lives lost (approximately 72,111 lives lost per year valued at about $6.1 million
each) and the value of non-fatal injuries. See Anderson, 42 J L & Econ at 624-26 (cited
in note 32). The $6.1 million per life measure appears to be about the average value
from many previous studies. See id, at 626. The value of non-fatal injuries is also based
on an average of prior studies valuing non-fatal injuries. See id at 626. The "crimeinduced production" reflects the estimated amount of resources spent on items that
result from or are associated with crime and hence cannot be spent on other items. See
id at 616-17. "Examples include the production of personal protection devices, the trafficking of drugs, and the operation of correctional facilities!' Id. at 616. Andersen provides a fairly detailed list of these expenditures. See id at 620. The "opportunity costs"
associated with crime in the text represent the value of the days victims were unable
to work due to the crime event, the time and effort spent by criminals in undertaking
crime, and the time and effort of victims in attempting to prevent crime (for example,
locking things). See id at 623-24.
35 See id at 620, 624 (this figure represents the sum of "Crime-Induced Production:
Corrections" and "Criminal lost workdays: in prison"). We recognize that these numbers miss some important costs. Indeed, they do not include the stigma costs, part of
the liberty costs, and the moral disutility costs of diluting the moral force of the criminal law referred to by the Court in Winship. However, we are using the numbers only
to determine whether the sanctioning and deterrence costs of errors, as commonly understood, would justify the reasonable doubt rule. An important part of our analysis is
to show the rough magnitude of other costs that need to be considered to justify the
reasonable-doubt rule if standard sanctioning and deterrence costs do not.
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be treated as underdeterrence costs, are on the order of fifteen times
greater than the sanctioning costs for all convictions. In view of the
magnitude of this differential, it seems improbable that the savings
from a measure that reduces crime by improving deterrence, such as
moving to the preponderance standard, would be swamped by a rise
in sanctioning costs. Indeed, the empirical evidence on the responsiveness of crime to changes in prison population suggests that this
is unlikely.
Surveying evidence on the responsiveness of crime to incarceration, Donohue and Siegelman estimate that the elasticity of crime
with respect to incarceration is. 15 and Steven Levitt finds an elasticity of .30.36 Using the lower figure, an increase in sanctioning costs of
200 percent (i.e., tripling the prison population and increasing sanctioning costs from $71 to $213 billion-a net increase of $142 billion), should be associated with a reduction in crime on the order of
30 percent, ((200)(.15) = 30). 7 This yields a deterrence benefit of $309
billion. Since the sanctioning cost of tripling the prison population
($142 billion) is less than the deterrence benefit ($309 billion), a switch
to the preponderance standard appears desirable on traditional errorcost grounds.
In sum, the readily-available empirical evidence does not suggest
that increases in sanctioning costs would fully offset the crimereduction benefits from switching to the preponderance rule.38 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the preponderance rule's incremental sanctioning costs are substantially less than the reasonable-doubt
rule's incremental under-deterrence costs.
Of course, we have been focusing only on measurable costs, but
there are the immeasurable costs (e.g., stigma and disutility costs)
36

See Donohue and Siegelman, 27 J Legal Stud at 13 (cited in note 33); Steven Levitt,

The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q J Econ 319 (1996) (finding elasticity figure of .30).
37 There is a net gain of $167 billion on these numbers by switching to the preponderance standard. Crime has dropped by $309 billion and sanctioning costs have risen
to $213 billion from $71 billion (that is, an increase of $142 billion). Thus, $309 billion
less $142 billion is $167 billion, which makes switching to the preponderance rule desirable on traditional error-cost grounds.
31 We should address a few issues raised by this discussion. First, the numbers we
have chosen from the Anderson study are the most conservative figures that he uses,
in the sense that they represent the lowest estimate of the cost of crime that Anderson
provides. Thus, they should be the most supportive of the traditional error cost rationale-but even they do not support the traditional error cost rationale. Second, we have
excluded costs associated with risk bearing. In particular, we have excluded the risk
bearing costs of being a potential victim and of being falsely convicted. However, since
the risk bearing costs associated with becoming a victim are probably far larger than
those associated with a false conviction, this exclusion biases the example against our
thesis. We thank Mitch Polinsky for the risk-bearing point.
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too. Although these are difficult to quantify, our analysis does provide
us with a sense of how large these other immeasurable costs must be
to justify the reasonable-doubt standard on the error cost account. It
would appear that these costs need to be quite large and perhaps
larger than the measurable costs. For example, return to the scenario
just considered: a tripling of the prison population (caused by a switch
from the reasonable-doubt to the preponderance standard) produces a
deterrence benefit of $309 billion and an increased sanctioning cost
of $142 billion. To justify choosing the reasonable-doubt standard over
the preponderance standard, the immeasurable costs generated by
the preponderance standard would have to add $167 billion to the
change in total sanctioning costs.
The required magnitude of these immeasurable costs is so large in
relation to the measurable costs that one is forced to question it. Put
another way, Winship's justification for the reasonable doubt rule
does not appear to receive obvious and uncontestable support in the
readily-available empirical evidence. If the immeasurable costs incorporated into the Winship analysis prove to be too small to justify
the reasonable doubt rule, what other costs excluded from this analysis should be considered? We explore this question in the remainder
of this paper.
IV. A PUBLIC CHOICE JUSTIFICATION
FOR PRO-DEFENDANT
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
We contend that the reasonable-doubt standard is designed primarily
to make it harder for individuals and groups to use the criminal process as a mechanism for wealth extraction. This reduces the social
costs generated by rent-seeking efforts to influence law enforcement
and enhances the deterrent effect of the law.
Implicit in this justification for pro-defendant criminal procedure
is the assumption that the state and its agents may have incentives
that diverge from those of the social ideal. The social ideal is the
outcome that a platonic philosopher-king would choose in order to
maximize social welfare. For reasons that have been explained in
the public choice literature, it is not necessarily the choice made
by a democratically elected legislature 3 9 much less that of a non39 See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223,
230-31 (1986) (expounding on the methods which interest groups can use to influence
the political process, and noting that interest groups can distort legislators' thinking,
which would then serve special interests rather than public interest). See also Gary
Minda, Interest Groups, PoliticalFreedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment
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democratic government. Moreover, prosecutors' interests may diverge from the social ideal as well. For example, the social ideal
might be to maximize the number of correct convictions and minimize the number of false convictions subject to a budget constraint. 40
Prosecutors, however, might be interested in trying to maximize the
number of convictions, to advance further in their careers, make
money, or a variety of other things. 41 The incentive divergence can
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,41 Hastings L J 905, 945 (1990) (commenting that
"Jilnterest groups are seen as 'rent-seekers' who influence the political process to achieve
their selfish economic interests, and legislators are seen as motivated to advance their
own self-interest"); Stephen J Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L J
1979, 1987 (1992) (articulating that as an agent of the state, prosecutors' decisions
"tend to diverge from those that would most efficiently serve the public interest" due
to personal or professional reasons); Stephen J Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion
as a Regulatory System, 17 J Legal Stud 43 (1988).
40 See Khanna, 82 BU L Rev at 361-62 (cited in note 21). For a similar approach, also
see Scott Baker and Claudio Mezzetti, ProsecutorialResources, Plea Bargaining,and
the Decision to Go To Trial,forthcoming 17 J L, Econ, & Org (2001) (using a model where
prosecutors are concerned about correct convictions and false convictions amongst
other things); Dirk G. Christensen, Comments: Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship:The
ProsecutorialDilemma in an Adversary System, 1981 Duke L J 311 (1981); Darryl K.
Brown, CriminalProcedureEntitlements, Professionalism,and Lawyering Norms, 61
Ohio St L J 801, 801 (2000).
11See Edward L Glaeser, et al, What Do ProsecutorsMaximize? An Analysis of the
Federalizationof Drug Crimes, 2 J L & Econ 259, 262-66 (2000); Gordon Van Kessel,
Adversary Excess in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L Rev 403, 441
(1992); William M. Landes, Economic Analysis of the Court, 14 J L & Econ 61 (1971);
Daniel C. Richman, Essay, Old Chief v United States: StipulatingAway Prosecutorial
Accountability?,83 Va L Rev 939, n 93 (1997); Christensen, 1981 Duke L J at 321 (cited
in note 40). Other reasons for a divergence between the social ideal and what prosecutors do may include that prosecutors and philosopher-kings consider the same things
important, but weight them differently For example, a philosopher-king might value
the avoidance of a false conviction more than a prosecutor might. Society might also
value certain convictions more than prosecutors might (e.g., society might value the
conviction of one drug overlord more than twenty convictions of small time drug dealers, but prosecutors might view things differently). In addition, error by prosecutors in
assessing the social value of certain cases may further widen the gap between prosecutorial and social welfare maximizing behavior.
Some of these issues are tied up with how prosecutors are rewarded. See Christensen, 1981 Duke L J at 311 (cited in note 40); Daniel C. Richman, FederalCriminal
Law, CongressionalDelegation andEnforcement Discretion,46 UCLA L Rev 757, 818
n 101 (1999); Tracey L Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 Fordham L Rev 851 (1995);
Glaeser, et al, 2 J L & Econ at 261 (cited in note 41) (noting that decisions to prosecute
are often influenced by prosecutors' interest in running for a higher office); Van Kessel,
67 Notre Dame L Rev at 442 (cited in note 41) (noting how win-loss records are very
important to state prosecutors). This raises interesting questions about why we reward
prosecutors in the way we do. This is the subject of a separate paper and outside the
scope of our present inquiry. As a first cut, one suspects convictions rates are the more
verifiable assessment criteria relative to others (much like profits are a bit easier to ver-
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manifest itself in4 behaviors
that induce lobbying of prosecutors or
2
other state actors.

Rent-seeking in the law enforcement process can occur in a variety
of forms. However, we think two general types capture its observed
forms. One is inter-group wealth expropriation,which arises when
one group attempts to gain some advantage from law enforcement
agents at the expense of other members of society.43 Equivalently, we
might describe this type of rent-seeking as an advanced version of
tribalism. The other general type of rent-seeking is simple corruption, which occurs when an individual uses bribery or some other
means, in connection with law enforcement, to extract wealth from
society or to avoid punishment for wrongdoing.
A. Inter-Group Wealth Expropriation
Rent-seeking behavior is a result of prosecutors acting in their unconstrained self-interest. If there are no constraints prosecutors may use
the criminal process to benefit themselves by selling their power to enforce the criminal law to the highest bidder. What prosecutors receive
could include direct or indirect monetary gain, enhanced chances for
power and prestige, or anything else of value to the prosecutor. 44 To
simplify we can say that prosecutors receive a certain sum-say $1
million-from the highest bidding group (A) to enforce the law in a
ify as assessment criteria relative to others in the corporate sphere when dealing with
the agency problem in that context).
42 Because prosecutorial or state interests may not match the social ideal we face
what can be termed an "agency cost" problem. See Michael C. Jensen and WH. Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 310 (1976) (discussing
"agency cost" in the context of the agency theory of corporations). In other words, to
the extent state actors take decisions that deviate from the social ideal, we can think
of the social welfare losses associated with their decisions as "agency" or incentivedivergence costs. Admittedly, this is a different approach to agency costs. The standard
account in Jensen & Meckling's article treats agency costs as the costs that result because the agent's incentives differ from those of the principal. See id. In our description
in the text, we are treating agency costs as the costs that result because state actors
have incentives that deviate from those of a platonic philosopher-king.
43 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More IntrusiveJudicial
Review?, 101 Yale L J 31, 35 (1991); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:
The Economics Of Group Status ProductionAnd Race Discrimination, 108 Harv L
Rev 1003, 1029-30 (1995) (noting that "[wihen interest groups pursue what economists call "rent-seeking" legislation, such as farm subsidies and tax "loopholes" they
seek merely to transfer resources from one group to another"); Angela 0. Davis, The
American Prosecutor:Independence,Power,and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L Rev
393, 459(2001).
44 See, for example, Richman, 46 UCLA L Rev at 818 n 102 (cited in note 41) (noting prosecutors' eagerness for career advancement); Christensen, 1981 Duke L J at 318
(cited in note 40) (noting that prosecutors are financially motivated).
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particular manner. Enforcement of the law in this manner must benefit the highest bidding group by more than $1 million-say $1.5 million-and these gains would appear to come at the expense of the
non-A groups (i.e., group B for simplicity). Thus, in a sense, A is using the prosecutor and the criminal process to extract $1.5 million
from B by paying the prosecutor $1 million. The groups realizing that
the prosecutor is willing to sell his services will lobby to secure some
of these gains from prosecutors and to prevent other groups from ex45
tracting wealth from them.
Inter-group wealth expropriation can be effected in a number of
ways. For example, there is lobbying that results in targeted or selective enforcement. The familiar case is where prosecutors disproportionately bring charges against members of group B because of the
lobbying efforts or simply to curry the favor of the dominant group A.
This permits group A members to shift the burden of criminal enforcement onto group B members or to impose costs on group B which result in some benefit to group A-e.g., the maintenance of a caste system. Indeed, in regimes in which prosecutors are elected, candidates
for the position will have incentives to seek support from group A by
promising to direct enforcement efforts against group B. 46 Perhaps
the best known example of this in United States history is law enforcement in the South during the Jim Crow period, which involved
numerous instances of prosecutors refusing to enforce the law against
white citizens, while using the threat of criminal punishment to co47
erce black citizens.
Another example of wealth expropriation in the enforcement pro45

Compare Paul H. Rubin and Martin J Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changingthe
Law, 23 J Legal Stud 807, 822-23 (1994)(rent-seeking motives of lawyers result in social
waste).
46 See Richman, 46 UCLA L Rev 757 (cited in note 41); William JStuntz, The Pathological Politics of CriminalLaw, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 520-34 J2001) (discussing the incentives of various participants in the American Criminal Justice system); Tracey L
McCain, The Interplay of Editorialand ProsecutorialDiscretionin the Perpetuation
of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 Colum J L & Soc Probs 601, 648 n 81
(1993) (noting that decisions to prosecute are susceptible to political influence because
most prosecutors are elected); Dwight L Greene, Abusive Prosecutors:Gender, Race
& Class Discretionand the Prosecutionof Drug-AddictedMothers, 39 Buff L Rev 737,
777 (1991) (noting that "Prosecutors ... are capable of conducting their offices in ways
to advance their own political careers").
47 See Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 91-97 (Harvard 1992); William J Stuntz,
Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum L Rev 1795, 1839 (1998) (noting that robbery laws
in the Jim Crow era were enforced against blacks more often than whites especially
where white robbers stole from black victims). It is possible (as one anonymous referee
for this paper has suggested to us) that under-enforcement of black-on-black crime was
the more serious problem during the Jim Crow period. Still, under-enforcement of crime
among blacks remains consistent with the rent-seeking model.
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cess is where prosecutors ask for some benefit to avoid bringing
charges against members of politically marginal groups. This is akin
to extortion or a protection racket. Knowing that politically powerful
groups will have him removed from office if he threatens their interests, the self-interested prosecutor would focus his extraction efforts
on the politically marginal. 4s The difference between this version of
inter-group wealth extraction and the first is slight: in the first, the
dominant group initiates the wealth extraction process and in the second, the prosecutor initiates the process. In the first case, the dominant group is likely to pay the prosecutor the smallest amount necessary to accomplish their ends, allocating the surplus to themselves.
In the second, the prosecutor who initiates the wealth extraction process allocates the surplus to himself. One example of this occurs in
rural areas of China, where local police officers have tried to enrich
themselves by enforcing certain prohibitions, such as the one-child
49
policy, against relatively poor farmers.
Yet another example of wealth expropriation is the passing of laws
with disproportionate burdens on different groups.50 This is analogous to targeted enforcement. In order to effect wealth expropriation,
the laws need not apply directly to group B members. The dominant
group (A) may find that certain activities are carried out only, or predominantly, by group B members, or that group B members carry out
these activities in a different manner from others. With this information, the dominant group may prohibit or place special burdens on
the activity when carried out in a particular manner. For example,
white majorities in the western United States enacted several facially
neutral statutes in the late 1800s that had the effect of prohibiting
Chinese laundries, both to limit competition from 5them and to limit
the independent work options of Chinese laborers. '
These cases are united by the common theme of one group benefiting at the expense of others through the use of the governmental process, whether law enforcement or legislation. As our concern is with
law enforcement, we will not discuss in much depth the passing of
laws with disproportionate burdens. However, the legislative and law
11See William N. Eskridge, Religion, Homosexuality,and Collisionsof Liberty and
Equality in American Public Law, 106 Yale L J 2411, 2447 (1997); Greene, 39 Buff L
Rev at 799 (cited in note 46).
49 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rural Flouting of China's One-Child Policy Undercuts
Census, NY Times (April 14, 2000).
- See, for example, Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev at 1795 (cited in note 46) (discussing
the heightened police attention given to urban crack markets dominated by the lower
economic class while law enforcement pays relatively little attention to the upscale
powder-cocaine market).
-' See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parityand the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 Wm
&Mary L Rev 211 (1999).
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enforcement processes provide alternative routes through which a
predatory dominant group could extract wealth from others. In this
sense, the legislative and law enforcement processes are substitutes
in the eyes of the wealth extractor. The laws controlling rent seeking
in these governmental processes can be understood as complements, in
the sense that they prevent a predatory dominant group from shifting2
its expropriation efforts from one governmental process to another.1
B. Simple Corruption
The other type of rent-seeking, simple corruption, involves the effort
of a single individual or group to extract wealth from the general population. We have in mind two cases: that of an enforcement agent (police officer or prosecutor) who threatens to apprehend and charge an
individual unless he pays the agent, and that of an enforcement agent
who is merely willing to accept bribes from the general public or individuals to enforce or not enforce the law in a particular way.5 3 Thus,
we consider instances where enforcement agents take bribes not to
enforce the law or where they take bribes to enforce the law in a particular way. In general, these payoffs can take two forms. One, ex ante
bribery, occurs when an individual bribes an enforcement agent before he commits a crime in exchange for an agreement by the agent
not to enforce the law against him. In the other form, ex post4 bribery,
the individual bribes the agent after he commits the crime.
There are many examples of simple corruption. A common example
of ex post bribery is a police officer that accepts bribes in return for
not issuing a ticket to a speeding motorist. Ex ante bribery appears to
be less common, though there are many examples of it too. In most
towns in the U.S., local government business is carried out by boards
made up of residents with deep and strong connections to many of the
-2 For discussion of how the procedural protections may induce greater lobbying at

the legislative level see Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev 505, passim (cited in note 46). We discuss this matter at note 103.
53One could argue that the simple corruption category is the same as our second
example of wealth expropriation, and we concede that the difference is more a matter
of degree than of character. In the second example, the enforcement agent maintains
his position through the support of local dominant groups. In the simple corruption
story, the enforcement agent is either unconcerned with maintaining support from local dominant groups (in the case of the actively predatory enforcer), or passively accepts bribes in exchange for not enforcing the law.
-4 For an economic analysis of criminal law that incorporates these distinctions, see
Mehmet Bac and Parimal Kanti Bag, Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions
5-6 (Oct 5, 2000) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid240989. See also Mehmet Bac, Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies, 12 J L, Econ, & Org 277 (1996).
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parties who appear before them. In these settings, it is hard to distinguish the ordinary reciprocal exchanges that are part of normal social
intercourse from ex ante bribery. The Supreme Court grappled with a
routine example of this in City of Columbia v. Omni OutdoorAdvertising,ss which involved the efforts of a local billboard company to
protect its incumbency advantage by encouraging the city council to
56
prohibit the erection of new billboards.
Because the criminal law enforcement process can be used by groups
or by individuals as a means to extract wealth, we should anticipate
a steady stream of efforts to use it for that purpose. In light of this it
becomes important to get a sense of the precise costs generated by
such behavior and methods for constraining them.
V. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ABUSIVE OR
"RENT-SEEKING" BEHAVIOR IN THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
We divide our discussion of the costs of rent-seeking in law enforcement into two parts: first, the costs related to the act of lobbying, and
second, the costs related to the effect of lobbying on the deterrent
force of the criminal law.
A. Direct Costs
Rent-seeking in the criminal process involves lobbying efforts to influence the selection and prosecution of cases. The process of lobbying itself generates costs that are, from a societal perspective, often
wasteful.
As a useful analogy, consider efforts to obtain a monopoly. Expenditures to obtain a monopoly may be desirable when a firm secures a
dominant position through competition because a firm typically does
this by improving its product, or reducing its costs; activities that
increase the total surplus. 57 However, some expenditures to obtain a
monopoly are socially wasteful-consider, for example, lobbying efforts to obtain a government privilege (e.g., an exclusive license or tar55

499 US 365 (1991).

56

The excluded firm brought an unsuccessful antitrust lawsuit on the ground that

the incumbent firm had colluded with city officials. The Supreme Court's reluctance
to apply the antitrust laws to this behavior is based in large part on the difficulty in distinguishing ex ante bribery from ordinary social intercourse. See id at 379-80.
-7 See Phillip Areeda and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and
Cases 7 (Aspen 5th ed 1997) (noting that "[cjompetitive forces generate efficiency in
two ways. Productive efficiency occurs as low cost producers undersell and thereby displace the less efficient. Allocative efficiency occurs as exchanges in the marketplace
direct production away from goods and services that consumers value less and toward
those they value more.. .').
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iff protection) or to deny a deserved privilege to someone else.5 8 This
kind of naked wealth extraction creates no additional surplus and
at the social cost
merely transfers an asset from one party to another
59
of the resources used to effectuate the transfer.
In the context of criminal law enforcement, efforts by group A to
lobby the prosecutor to enforce selectively against group B are often
wasteful in a sense similar to naked wealth extraction. Of course, the
result is not an entire waste if targeting group B reduces the overall
costs of crime. 60 However, there is little reason to believe that lobbying for selective enforcement will always bring about an efficient result. For example, group A will have no interest in inducing the prosecutor to go after cases of crime involving only members of group B
as victims. Further, group A members may discourage the prosecutor
from enforcing the law when members of their own group commit
crimes against group B. The social waste from lobbying includes some
portions of the lobbying efforts of politically dominant groups, the
counter-lobbying efforts of non-dominant groups, and some portion of
the effort and time spent by government officials in addressing wealth
transfers and maneuvering to obtain positions in which they can di6
rect such transfers. '
So far we have focused on the costs associated with inter-group
expropriation efforts, but analogous arguments apply in the context
of simple corruption. 62 Corruption creates costs in terms of the resources spent in bribing the enforcement agent to enforce or not to
enforce the law in some way and the efforts of the agent in positioning himself to take bribes. However, there is an important feature of
the corruption model that suggests that rent-seeking costs can be
much larger than appears initially The enforcement process is vertis1 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 11229-46 (Cambridge 2d ed 1989).
-9 See id at 229-46.
60 It might be that lobbying coincides with what might be socially desirable. Also
lobbying is not necessarily limited to inter-group lobbying. For example, if the victims
of crimes by members of group B are other group B members then group B may lobby
prosecutors to stop crime in their areas and hence lobby for prosecutions against other
group B members. This sort of lobbying does not raise the kinds of concerns we are discussing in this paper. See Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent-Seeking, in James Buchanan,
R.D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds, Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society
97-112 (Texas A & M 1980).
61 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure
Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q J Econ 371, 373-74 (1983). The easier it is to obtain
governmental favors the more lobbying should appear. Also, as the value of the issues
at stake increases one should expect greater expenditures as well.
62 Note that a bribe might be efficient in some cases, much as lobbying for targeted
enforcement might be. See Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1 (1974); Padideh Ala'i,
The Legacy of GeographicalMorality and Colonialism: A HistoricalAssessment of
the CurrentCrusadeAgainst Corruption,33 Vand J Transnatl 877, 899 (2000).

80

A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure

cally fragmented, in the sense that it moves through a chain beginning with a police officer (and next his superiors), moving to a prosecutor, and on to a magistrate or judge, and so on. If each one of these
agents demands bribes to enforce or not enforce the law, then the total social waste will be considerably larger than in a vertically integrated enforcement regime in which a single agent controls the pro63
cess from arrest to punishment.

B. Deterrence and Other Costs from Rent-Seeking
In the context of the criminal process rent-seeking, if successful, has
the effect of skewing law enforcement. In this part we discuss three
ways in which rent-seeking reduces the social benefits from law enforcement: first, by reducing the direct sanctions imposed on offenders; second, by reducing indirect sanctions imposed on offenders through stigma and reputation costs; and, third, by increasing the
cost of enforcing the law.
1. Some deterrent effects of selectively enforcing the law
Selective enforcement of the law due to lobbying can have corrosive
effects on deterrence. Consider, for example, where lobbying by group
63 See Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q J Econ 599 (1993).
The vertical fragmentation of law enforcement means that each individual agent is in
a position similar to that of successive owners of the pieces of a toll road. One of the
standard results is that the sum of the tolls charged by successive owners will be larger
than the toll charged by a single owner of a road. This is known in the monopolization
literature as the double-marginalization problem, see Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J Pol Econ 347 (1950); Andy C.M. Chen and Keith N.
Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 Hastings LJ 573, 623 (1999).
See also Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries,69 U Chi L Rev 1, 23 (2001) (arguing that "under simple models of vertical
control where the downstream firm is assumed to have market power, social welfare is
unambiguously increased by the elimination of the double marginalization. One firm
rather than two marks up the price of the upstream product, leading to a lower price
and higher output.'); John E. Lopatka and Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for Foreclosurein Antitrust, 73 Tex L Rev 1255, 1297 (1995) (arguing that "if the products were complements, their provision by a single supplier could
increase efficiency, for monopoly provision of complementary products can avoid the
kind of double-marginalization problem well recognized in the context of vertically
related, or successive, monopolies.") For discussion of a related problem-the problem of the anti-commons see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Propertyin the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621 (1998); James
Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons
Property,43 J L & Econ 1 (2000); Francesco Parisi, Ben Depoorter, and Norbert Schulz,
Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons, University of Virginia School of
Law, Law & Economics Research Papers Series, Research Paper No 00-16 (Draft 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=224844.
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A members results in selective law enforcement against group B members, with little regard to the actual guilt of the defendants, and disproportionately less enforcement against group A members.
In this scenario, deterrence is likely to drop for both groups A and
B. In general, deterrence can be achieved through substitutioneffects
or scale effects. Substitution effects occur when a change in the effective sanction leads potential offenders to substitute legitimate, lawcomplying conduct for illegitimate, undesirable conduct. Scale effects
occur when enforcement causes potential offenders to stay out of certain areas, or off the streets at certain times. A selective enforcement
policy in which group B is targeted implies, within a fixed budget setting, a diversion of resources from substitution-oriented policies to
scale-oriented policies. This is analogous to shifting from a strategy
of ticketing every motorist that speeds (inducing substitution toward
slow driving) to a strategy of ticketing motorists who meet the profile of a speeder, whether or not they are speeding (inducing drivers
who fit the profile to stay off the roads).
Now, in our scenario, group A members are under-deterred because
they are facing low expected sanctions for engaging in undesirable activities.64 The deterrent effect on group B members would also be reduced because they are now punished whether they have been "good"
or "bad. 65 In other words, the incentive to comply with the law is reduced for group B members because the payoffs from compliance and
noncompliance have gotten closer.
An enforcement policy chosen by group A members that reduces
deterrence may seem irrational, because it could lead to additional
crimes being committed against group A members. However, there
are scenarios in which such a policy could be chosen rationally by
group A. For example, if groups A and B are geographically segregated,
group A may choose to reduce potential crimes by Bs on As by apprehending all Bs who venture into their territory, whether or not the
Bs are complying with the law.66 Such a policy would make it costly
64

See Polinsky and Shavell, 5 J L, Econ, & Org 99 (cited in note 28).

65

See id at 104 (stating that 'A type II error (a truly innocent defendant is found li-

able) lowers the incentive to obey the law because he will face liability even if he obeys,
thereby reducing the benefit to him of obeying the law"). See, for example, Joel Schrag
and Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in
CriminalTrials, 10 J L Econ & Org 319 (1994); Polinsky and Shavell, 5 J L, Econ, & Org
99 (cited in note 28).
66 See, for example, David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics,and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn L Rev 265, 271 (1999) (discussing law enforcement's tendency to subject black drivers in upscale neighborhoods to traffic
stops). Note that one implication of the theory here is that "racial profiling" may be
socially undesirable under some conditions. For some empirical evidence on racial
profiling see John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Pol Econ 203 (2001); John J Donohue III
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for Bs to move among As, encouraging the Bs to stay in their own territory. In other words, group A members may choose to rely on scale
effects to reduce the risks posed to them by group B offenders. Such
a policy, in a fixed budget setting, could easily result in a weakening
6
at the substitution-effect level in deterrence among Bs. 1
2. Other costs: stigma effects, expressive effects, enforcement
cost effects
Rent-seeking probably reduces the stigma associated with criminal
punishment. If the criminal label carries some stigma then that becomes part of the total sanction for criminal behavior and influences
a
deterrence. 68 Anything that reduces the stigma, without causing 69
countervailing increase in the official sanction, reduces deterrence.
The stigma from being labeled a criminal stems in part from a
belief that the person so labeled has violated a societal norm meriting condemnation and has been adjudicated in a "fair and impartial" manner.70 If, however, being labeled a criminal is perceived by
members of one's social circle as indicative of a political or biased
use of the law, which itself may be the result of rent-seeking in the
and Steven Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J L & Econ 367
(2001).
67 Another scenario might be where lobbying by group A members leads to selective enforcement against group B members focusing on those who are guilty,but again
with disproportionately less enforcement against group A members. In this case the
same potential under-deterrence problem for group A members exists because again
they face low expected sanctions. However, for the group B members the situation has
changed. The deterrent effect on group B members may still remain or be enhanced because in this case if a group B member complies with the law he is probably not going
to be prosecuted and if he fails to comply he is more likely to be prosecuted. The overall impact on deterrence is ambiguous in this case. However, given that A members are
assumed to control the enforcement process, one probable scenario is where their law
enforcement agent (the prosecutor) is unable, because of unfamiliarity or indifference,
to distinguish complying from non-complying members of group B. With a prosecutor
unable or unwilling to distinguish the "good" from the "bad" among group B, a policy
of targeting only the bad in group B would be infeasible. This suggests that the outcome discussed in the text, in which deterrence falls unambiguously, is a plausible
outcome of selective enforcement.
68 See Khanna, 109 Harv L Rev at 1508-09 (cited in note 18); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politicsof Distinction",
83 Geo L J 2547, 2561 (1995).
69 See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va L
Rev 349,350 (1997); Richard Moran, Home Sweet Home: Given a Choice, Many Convicts are Now Opting for Jail Instead of Probation:Why?, Boston Globe El (Oct 29,

2000).
70

See generally Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Dessert, 91 Nw
U L Rev 453 (1997).
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law enforcement process, then the stigma from the criminal label
71
diminishes.

For similar reasons, rent seeking is likely to reduce any expressive or symbolic features of the criminal law. The criminal law may
express to society what is undesirable behavior and this encourages individuals not to engage in this activity because they respect
or otherwise value the law (i.e., legal norm internalization).7 2 If so,

then a perceived increase in rent-seeking can only serve to weaken
this respect because the message that the activity is undesirable is
clouded by the message that law enforcement is selective and biased. This reduces whatever ability the criminal law has to express
condemnation, shape preferences or influence behavior outside of pure
deterrence based on expected sanctions. 73 Second, members of society may derive some utility from expressing condemnation. 74 Although this may be true in some instances the benefits from this
must be weighed against the costs of rent-seeking and the extent to
which the perception of rent-seeking reduces the utility from ex75
pressing condemnation.

3. Enforcement Costs
In addition to stigma and expressive effects, rent seeking may have
enforcement-cost effects. If law enforcement is perceived to be biased
then it is likely that some people will refuse to assist law enforce71 See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 97-100 (Harvard 2000) (noting that criminal offenders can signal loyalty to a subcommunity by violating the law and being
punished by the dominant group. The subcommunity is more likely to view criminal
punishment as a signal of loyalty to the subcommunity the more the subcommunity
believes the criminal justice system is "infected with a political agenda"); Dan Kahan,
83 Va L Rev at 357-58 (cited in note 69); Janice Nadler, The Effects of Perceived Injustice on Deference to the Law, at 9-10, Draft 2000 (on file with authors) (suggesting that,
if the law is seen to be imposed in an irrelevant or immoral manner, it will not be deferred to).
72 See, for example, Robert Cooter, Do Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of InternalizingLegal Values, Working Paper Series 16 (UC Berkeley Law and
Economics); Dan Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591,
603-04 (1996); Richard McAdams, Legal Construction of Norms, 86 Va L Rev 1649
(2000); Cass Sunstein, Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa L Rev 2021, 2022, 202529)1996).
73See Kahan, 83 Va L Rev 349 (cited in note 69); Sunstein, 144 U Pa L Rev 2021).
74 See Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 691,
693-94; see also Interdisciplinary Program Series, The New Chicago School Myth of
Reality?, 5 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 1, 3 (1998); Robinson and Darley, 91 Nw U L Rev
at 472 (cited in note 70).
75 See generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
Harv L Rev 961, 1244-45 (2001).
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ment.7 6 This would increase the difficulty and costs associated with
apprehensions and prosecutions, which in turn reduces the likeli77
hood that wrongdoers will be sanctioned.
VI. METHODS OF CONSTRAINING
RENT-SEEKING
In this Part we examine two methods of constraining law enforcement
agents in order to dampen rent seeking in the law enforcement process: procedural protections and penalty restrictions.7 8 We also provide a positive theory for the basic procedural rules in this area.
A. Procedural Protections
Procedural protections constrain rent-seeking in the criminal process by making the process costly for both law enforcement agents
76 Compare Nadler, Effects of Perceived Injustice at 32-41 (cited in note 71) (discussing results of certain experiments which suggest that group identity does matter
when law enforcement is perceived to be "unjust" reflected in willingness to commit
unrelated wrongs and mock juror verdicts).
17 One possibility worth noting is that if a group of people are reluctant to provide
information to law enforcement about other members in their group (even without selective enforcement issues) then that might be a reason itself to proceed with selective
enforcement in that group to increase the probability of being sanctioned. See Kay B.
Perry, Fighting CorruptionAt The Local Level: The FederalGovernment's Reach Has
Been Broadened, 64 Mo L Rev 157, 162 (1999). Of course, such a policy might only exacerbate the "us" and "them" mentality.
78 Constraining prosecutorial behavior to reduce rent-seeking costs is, in a rough
sense, analogous to the efforts of corporate law in constraining the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control. This analogy is far from perfect. We
want enforcement agents to protect society's interests, even if they diverge from those
of the government. In the corporate context, we usually ask corporate agents to act on
behalf of shareholders, whether or not shareholder interests diverge from the social
ideal. See generally Robert C. Clark, CorporateLaw (Aspen 1986); William A. Klein
and J Mark Ramseyer, Business Associations-Agency,Partnerships,and Corporations
(Foundation 4th ed 2000). The prosecutor can be viewed as an agent for society in a
manner similar to how a manager or employee is often viewed as an agent for a corporation. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargainingas Negotiation, 2 Harv Negotiation L Rev 115 (1997) (noting that "[a] prosecutor... is the
agent of the people whom the office purports to protect."). However, unlike the corporate context, environmental factors that constrain the agency costs of private firms are
not present in the case of governments. Since governments do not issue stock, we do
not observe discounts in their share prices due to agency costs, nor do governments
face the same risk of losing out to competitors as business enterprises do. See Clark
CorporateLaw at ch 4 (1986) (cited in this note); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 Cal
L Rev 795, 811 )1983) (arguing that different compensation schemes and techniques
should have the effect of reducing conflicts of interest with fiduciaries). Hence, explicit
constraints on rent-seeking play a relatively important role in the public sector.
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and for society. Prosecutors, who are rewarded when conviction rates
are high, bear much of the brunt of the costs of these procedures.7 9
A key function of pro-defendant procedural protections is to increase the probability that a prosecutor and a bribing party will be unable to find a mutually-acceptable bribe, thus making the set of contractible bribes zero or close to it. This works as follows.
First, consider the effects of procedural protections on inter-group
expropriation through selective enforcement. On the prosecutor's side,
procedural protections raise the cost of targeting innocent parties as
well as the costs of letting the guilty go free. If the prosecutor at the
behest of group A targets innocent group B members, he is unlikely to
be successful given all the pro-defendant procedures. If he maintains
his promise to target group B, he will have few successful prosecutions, and will probably lose his job (as high conviction rates are important to prosecutors). This suggests that the prosecutor will demand
a high bribe in order to adopt a selective enforcement policy. Moreover,
given the risk of losing his job, potential bribers will doubt the credibility of the prosecutor's promise to selectively enforce. In view of the
difficulty of implementing a successful selective enforcement policy
and the doubtful credibility of a prosecutor who promises to do so,
80°
the potential briber's willingness-to-pay should fall substantially
79 See J Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmussen, Why is the Japanese Conviction
Rate So High, 30 J Legal Stud 53 (2001) (arguing that because of the stigma in Japan of
acquitting defendants and the corresponding detrimental career effects it may have for
prosecutors and judges, they prosecute only strong cases); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice, 44 Vand L
Rev 45 n 264 (arguing that "[tlo the extent a prosecutor's conviction rate is all that
counts, the institutional incentives point toward minimizing the responsibility to 'do
justice'.") See also Tracey L Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 Fordham L Rev 851 (proposing a system of incentives to effect prosecutors' conduct).
The difficulty of using the process and the attendant cost involved makes it less
useful as a wealth-extraction tool than perhaps other options and should shift lobbying and rent-seeking away, to some extent, from the criminal process to other methods
of influencing government behavior. See Paul H. Rubin, Christopher Curran, and John
Curran, Litigation Versus Legislation:Forum Shopping by Rent-Seekers, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=1 91269.
10We should note that in the above example we are assuming the level of criminalization of conduct around the time that the traditional rules were put in place. In the
modern era with the increasing criminalization of conduct it is not clear that it would
be difficult for prosecutors to convict someone in spite of these protections, given how
many options they have. See Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev at 509-15 (cited in note 46).
For analyses of bribery and law enforcement, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell, Corruptionand Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J Pub Econ 1 (2001); A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, On the Disutilityand Discountingof Imprisonment and
the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J Legal Stud 1 (1999). See also Kaplow and Shavell, 114
Harv L Rev at 961 n 637 (cited in note 75). On the social costs of corruption, see Robert
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Next, consider the effects of procedural protections on simple corruption-i.e., individual attempts to use law enforcement as a path
to wealth. Procedural protections make it difficult for corruption to
flourish. A prosecutor who on his own initiative threatens to arrest
individuals on false charges would find it difficult to mount a credible threat against his victims in the presence of procedural protections. Moreover, the prosecutor's ability to credibly promise not to
enforce the law against a particular defendant (in exchange for a bribe)
should fall. For if the prosecutor charges the wrong person or no one
at all, he most likely will be unsuccessful in obtaining a conviction
for the crime. Given his difficulty in charging and convicting an alternate candidate, the cost to the prosecutor of promising not to
enforce against a particular defendant is relatively high, and the promise probably cannot be considered fully credible. These factors suggest that the prosecutor's power to shake down individuals for money
in exchange for a promise not to bring charges is severely diminished
in the regime with procedural protections. Moreover, the potential
defendant's willingness to pay a bribe falls since he is less likely to be
convicted in the first place if he is innocent, and any promise by the
prosecutor not to enforce against a guilty defendant cannot be regarded as credible. 81
We can see in greater detail how procedural protections dampen
corruption in the context of the two major types of procedural protection: the reasonable doubt standard and the double jeopardy rule. Both
reduce the prosecutor's power to selectively enforce. In this sense,
they clearly fall within the analysis of this section because they simultaneously raise the cost to the prosecutor of implementing a selective policy and lower the value to the potential beneficiary of
seeking such a policy. The reasonable-doubt rule accomplishes this
task by directly reducing the probability of a guilty verdict and increasing the amount of evidence necessary for conviction. The double
jeopardy rule aids in this task by preventing the prosecutor from
Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption(U Cal 1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption:A
Study in PoliticalEconomy (AP Prof 1978); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J Econ Liter 1320 (1997), and Andrei Schleifer and
Robert W Vishny, Corruption,108 Q J Econ 599 (1993).
81 We do not discuss what might happen if the defendant suffered a large stigma
simply from being charged or indicted for certain kinds of wrongdoing. See In re Fried,
161 F2d 453, 458 (2d Cir 1947) (noting that "[flor a wrongful indictment is no laughing
matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable injury to the person indicted. The stigma
cannot be easily erased."). See also, Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-fulfilling Expectations of Criminality,39 J L & Econ 519 (1996). In such cases the potential for corruption and wealth extraction are greater because the prosecutor can gain or impose
costs without actually having to win at a trial (i.e., without having to obtain a conviction). These instances are simply outside the scope of this paper.
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bringing successive prosecutions against the same defendant, with
the hope of eventually learning how to convict the defendant on weak
evidence.
This theory suggests that the reasonable doubt and double jeopardy
rules have complementary functions. No matter how low the probability of successful targeting is reduced as a result of the reasonable
doubt rule, the prosecutor may still have an incentive to adopt a selective enforcement policy if he can bring successive actions against
a defendant. In the extreme case in which the prosecutor can bring an
infinite number of successive actions against the defendant, he is
likely to eventually get a conviction, no matter how small the probability of conviction in the individual trial. s 2 The more worrisome
case, however, is where the prosecutor learns from a previous mistake and uses the information from a "test trial" to boost the probability of conviction to a near certainty in the second trial.8 3 The double
jeopardy rule emerges in this framework as a rule designed to prevent
enforcement agents from substituting toward a successive prosecution strategy in order to avoid the constraint imposed by the reason8 4
able doubt rule.
B. Penalty Restrictions or "Inefficient Punishments"
Another way to constrain the costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or punishment authority is to put restrictions on the size of
penalties or the process by which they are levied. David Friedman
has described the size and process restrictions as "inefficient" punishments.8 5 Friedman distinguishes inefficient punishments, like
82

Suppose the probability of conviction in one trial is p. If the prosecutor can bring

an infinite number of successive actions, each with the same probability of conviction,
the likelihood of eventual conviction is p + (1 - p)p + (1 - p) 2p +. . . + (1 - p)Np, which
approaches 1 as N approaches infinity. For example, if p is 30 percent against an innocent individual then by the fourth trial the cumulative probability of conviction has
risen to approximately 75 percent.
We should note that the strength of double jeopardy's protection would be weakened
if a great deal of conduct was criminalized (as that provides prosecutors more discretion). See Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev at 509-15 (cited in note 46). This would be a reason
to examine potential adaptations in response to this increased threat of rent-seeking.
83 See Developments in the Law-CorporateCrime:Regulating CorporateBehavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 Harv L Rev 1341-49 (1979).
'" This statement is not meant to exclude alternate means of perhaps restraining
prosecutorial retrials. For example, if in the initial trial the reasonable doubt standard
required 95 percent certainty of guilt before conviction then we could require a 96 percent certainty of guilt in retrial number 1. If there was a second retrial then we could
require a 97 percent likelihood of guilt and so forth. Even then, given the argument in
note 82 it is doubtful that much would be gained through this approach.
8- See Friedman, 107 J Polit Econ at 259 (cited in note 7).
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prison, from "efficient" punishments, like the death penalty administered quickly or a large monetary penalty equal to the defendant's
wealth. 86 The argument is that efficient punishments do not impose
large direct costs on the state and hence prosecutors may have an
incentive to use them to extract wealth from defendants." However,
inefficient punishments impose substantial costs on the state and
therefore present obstacles to the use of the criminal process as a
means of extracting wealth.8 8
At least two types of penalty restrictions are relevant to this analysis: the prohibition of retroactive punishments and of cruel and unusual punishments.8 9 The latter restriction fits comfortably with the
analysis here as well as Friedman's. As Friedman notes, the state could
easily adopt a low-cost system of punishment; defendants could be
executed, enslaved, and so forth.9 0 Instead, we observe a system in
which the state forgoes the opportunity to extract all of the defendant's wealth, and incarceration prevents the state from taking full
advantage of the convict's labor. The constitutional prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments is in part responsible for this choice,
although the choice seems to have been made in some countries
where there is no such explicit prohibition. 91
The historical evidence is consistent with this view of the constraining function of the cruel and unusual punishment clause.92 The
first restrictions on excessive penalties in English law appeared in the
Magna Carta, in chapters regulating discretionary fines. 93 The discretionary fines, or "amercements, ' 94 obviously had the potential to be
used as a source of revenue for the state, and as a source of private income in a period in which much of criminal prosecution was under86 See

id at 260-61.

87 See id at 261.
88 See id at 263-64.

89See US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 (stating "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.") A similar prohibition applies to the states: "No State shall ... pass
any Bill of Attainder... :"Id, Art I, § 10, cl 1; US Const Amend VIII (stating "Exces-

sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
90 See Friedman, 107 J Polit Econ 259 (cited in note 7).
91For example, Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast do not have a rule
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. Yet, the state in those countries has apparently not gone to the extreme of trying to profit from punishing the guilty. For information on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, see <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/>.
92 See Anthony E Grannuci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual PunishmentsInflicted": The
OriginalMeaning,57 Cal L Rev 839, 844-48 (1969).
93 See
94 Id.

id at 845.
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taken by private parties. 95 It was their abuse that led the authors of the
Magna Carta to devote three chapters to their control. 96 These proviprohibitions of excessive
sions later evolved into the more modern
97
and disproportionate punishments.
Consistent with Friedman's argument, our analysis suggests that
penalty restrictions increase the cost of punishment to the state,
dampening incentives for wealth extraction, and at the same time reduce the amount a potential defendant would be willing to pay in order to avoid being charged with a crime. The prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments reduces the potential for the state or prosecutor to punish innocent individuals in order to profit from their punishment. By raising the cost of punishment, the prohibition enhances
the likelihood that the state will punish only the guilty.9 It also dampens incentives individuals have to become prosecutors in order to enrich themselves.
The prohibition of retroactive punishments-a restriction on the
penalty imposition process-constrains rent-seeking at the legislative level. In the absence of such a restriction, interest groups could
use the criminal process to confiscate the wealth of other groups or
particular individuals. A predatory enforcement regime could retroactively impose a criminal penalty on the activity of a particular group
and use the new law as leverage to expropriate their wealth. The ex
post facto and bill of attainder clauses in the Constitution both apply
to this type of activity. The ex post facto clause applies specifically to
legislative attempts to punish retroactively.99 The bill of attainder
clause applies to legislative attempts to punish particular individuals
without a trial. 00
95On privately-initiated enforcement, see, for example, Friedman, 107 J Polit Econ
at 264 (cited in note 7).
96See Grannuci, 57 Cal L Rev at 845-46 (cited in note 92).
91See id.
98The reason the incentive to go after the truly guilty increases because of inefficient punishments requires some explanation. An inefficient punishment increases
the costs of convicting anyone (guilty or innocent). This should result in the state (and
the prosecutor) shifting more resources towards targeting the truly guilty rather than
bringing cases against the innocent as the expected payoffs from convicting the truly
guilty are probably higher than the expected payoffs from convicting the innocent.
9 See Harold J Krent, The Puzzling BoundaryBetween Criminaland Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo L J 2143 (1996); Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause
and The Jurisprudenceof Punishment,35 Am Crim L Rev 1261 (1998).
100See Jane Welsh, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An UnqualifiedGuaranteeof Process, 50 Brooklyn L Rev 77 (1983); Thomas B. Griffin, Beyond Process:A Substantive
Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 Va L Rev 475 (1984). We will focus our
discussion below on the ex post facto clause for the sake of brevity. Note that both
clauses induce a reactive type of rent-seeking, as they seem to invite defendants to
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The distinction between penalty restrictions and procedural protections suggests that these types of rules, both designed to dampen
rent-seeking, serve as complements: procedural protections work better in the short run while penalty restrictions work better in the long
run.' 0 The procedural protections described earlier-the reasonabledoubt rule and the double-jeopardy rule-operate in the short run to
remove incentives for the prosecutor to selectively enforce the law.
However, if the background institutional structure is one that allows
the state to profit from the punishment of individuals, we should
worry about how long the prosecutor will be able to stay out of the
predatory enforcement game. Just as the potential for profit induces
entry of new businesses in the private sector, the potential for profit
in enforcement should induce entry of a similar sort in the public sector. Creative prosecutors would find ways to modify the procedural
rules, plea bargain around them, or to lobby the legislature until the
desired changes were enacted.10 2 Penalty restrictions constrain this
long-term erosion process by reducing the potential for profit in criminal law enforcement. 103
challenge virtually every effort to punish on the ground that it is either a disguised bill
of attainder or retroactive penalty
101A key difference between procedural protections and penalty restrictions has
to do with how much of the cost of each method the prosecutor bears. The costs of
penalty restrictions or inefficient punishments are borne largely by the state and society, but not particularly by the prosecutor. They impose only an indirect cost on the
prosecution. In contrast, pro-defendant procedures impose direct costs on prosecutors
because they make obtaining convictions more difficult. Given that high conviction
rates are important to many prosecutors for career reasons, we would expect prosecutors to respond more to these direct measures than to indirect concerns about how
much a punishment is costing the state. This is especially so when many prosecutors
are paid by local authorities and prisons are funded by state authorities. See Stuntz, 100
Mich L Rev at 520-33 (cited in note 46) (discussing the incentives of the different actors in law enforcement). In some respects one can view the procedural protections as
alignment measures-trying to align prosecutors' interests with social welfare (or the
benevolent state)-whereas the inefficient punishments might be seen as constraints
on a non-benevolent state.
102 See Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev at 509-15 (cited in note 46) (arguing that because
criminal codes are so broad it gives a prosecutor the ability to selectively enforce). This
suggests that we may want to re-examine some procedural protections in light of these
developments and the increased potential for rent-seeking.
103 The procedural constraints we have discussed might reduce the incentive to
lobby law enforcers, but might lead parties to more lobbying on the legislative side.
Penalty restrictions, to the extent they are part of constitutional law, reduce incentives
for legislative lobbying. In addition, any set of restraints that forces rent-seeking groups
to use more costly methods of extracting wealth should have the desired effect of
dampening rent-seeking incentives. At a minimum, the restraints considered here
have that effect.
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C. Some Implications for the Jury
Although we have focused on rent-seeking in the enforcement process rather than in the legislative process, the jury serves as an important constraint against both types of rent-seeking. 0 4 A prosecutor
who brings politically motivated charges against members of politically weak groups faces the risk, under the jury system, of being unable to gain a unanimous verdict from a jury consisting of some members from the weak group. Indeed, the theory of this paper suggests an
important rationale for the requirement of unanimity among jurors
in criminal trials.10 5 The need to obtain a unanimous verdict makes
it more difficult for the prosecutor to selectively target politically
marginal groups or individuals in the law enforcement process. The
need to obtain a unanimous verdict from the jury also gives the jury
the power to nullify statutes designed to expropriate wealth from politically marginal groups.
Our theory also provides some insight into the original function of
challenges to the jury's composition, including the controversial problem of peremptory challenges. Blackstone said that challenges could be
put to either the whole array of jurors or to individual jurors, and that
challenges to the array are at once an exception to the whole
panel,... and they may be made upon account of partiality or
some default in the sheriff, or his under-officer who arrayed the
panel.... Also, though there be no personal objection against
the sheriff, yet if he arrays the panel at the nomination, or under
the direction of either party, this is good cause of challenge to
06
the array. 1
In other words, the fundamental common law rationale for permitting challenges to the whole jury is the suspicion, no doubt grounded
on evidence, that the sheriff chose the jurors in order to maximize his
chances of obtaining a conviction. Challenges to the whole arraywere
apparently permitted to prevent the sheriff from implementing a selective enforcement policy
'04 See Duncanv Louisiana,391 US 145, 156 (1968) ("[p]roviding an accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.")
105An alternative explanation for the unanimity requirement-that it reduces false
convictions-may not be terribly convincing. See Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiorityof UnanimousJury Verdicts, 92
Am Polit Sci Rev 23 (1998) (arguing that under plausible assumptions the unanimity
requirement may result in an increase in false convictions relative to a supermajority
vote requirement).
106 See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at 359 (cited in note 13).
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Challenges to individual jurors could be based on cause, or could
be peremptory in the sense of not being based on any of the accepted
grounds.10 7 Peremptory challenges were granted only to the defendant.os Although peremptory challenges have come under attack more
recently as a form of invidious discrimination, 0 9 the original purpose
is somewhat easier to see in the context of a rent-seeking model. One
could view the peremptory, in this analysis, as giving the defendant
a zone of unquestioned authority in the choice of jurors, so long as
he did not use it to an excessive degree. If a wily predatory sheriff had
managed to choose conviction-prone jurors in a way that would be
difficult to challenge on the accepted grounds, the defendant could
always fall back on his peremptory challenges. To the extent that this
obstruction stood in the way of any effort to selectively enforce the
law, the sheriff would have a smaller incentive to try to control the
composition of the jury. l0
107See id at 361-63.
108See id at 362.

109
See JEB vAlabama exrel TB, 511 US 127, 140 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges);
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89 (1986) (holding the prosecutor's peremptory challenges based solely on race were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.)
10 In addition, when the right to a jury trial is available may be consistent with a
rent-seeking approach as well. Jury trials are available as of right for most criminal cases
except those that carry trivial or fairly small penalties. See Duncan v Louisiana,391
US 145, 160 (1968) (holding that "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which
is not subject to the 6th Amendment jury trial provisions"). This is consistent with
rent-seeking because trials that carry very small or trivial penalties may not be particularly attractive means with which to extract wealth for prosecutors. See Friedman,
107 J Polit Econ at 268 (cited in note 7). For such small sanctions the costs of the jury
trial are probably not justified by any reduction in rent-seeking (which is probably
small in this context).
Further, alternative explanations for the right to a jury trial do not appear to provide
as complete a picture as they might if they considered concerns with rent-seeking. One
potential explanation for the right to a jury trial is that society values the expression
of the popular will as reflected in a jury decision. See Spaziano v Florida,468 US 447
(1984) (Stevens dissenting in part) (arguing that the right to have an authentic representation of the community's views on the determination that must precede a deprivation of liberty supports the constitutional entitlement to a trial by jury). If this were
the only purpose behind the right to a jury trial we would expect all jury de6isions to
be unreviewable. However, this is not the case because the law permits jury convictions to be appealed but not jury acquittals. See Kepner v United States, 195 US 100
(1903). See also Steinglass, 31 Ind L Rev at 354-55 (cited in note 21).
Another potential explanation for the right to a jury trial is that it either reduces erroneous decisions relative to bench trials or is less likely to falsely convict relative to
bench trials. See Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 6-7 (Little,
Brown 1971). This argument is not particularly convincing because it is a little difficult to believe that jury trials are likely to be more accurate (i.e., less error prone) than
bench trials. One doubts there is any empirical evidence to support this result and our
legal system also seems to suggest that jury trials may be more prone to errors than
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We have been concerned so far with explaining broad institutional features. In this Part we extend the argument by taking a look at the case
law associated with pro-defendant protections. Since criminal procedure is a vast area, we can provide only a sketch here. We claim that
this paper's framework provides a good positive theory of substantial
parts of criminal procedure doctrine.
A. Double Jeopardy
As a general matter, Double Jeopardy reduces the prosecutor's power
to selectively enforce or abuse his discretion in a manner complementary to the reasonable doubt standard. Double Jeopardy complements the reasonable doubt rule by preventing the prosecutor from
bringing successive prosecutions against the same defendant with the
hope of eventually learning how to convict the defendant on weak evidence."I In brief, our claim is that the essentialpurpose of Double
bench trials. See Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 126-27 (Perseus
1986) (stating that "[wie are thus led to the conclusion that jurors may not always be
able to follow the law as it is intended to be."). Much of the law of evidence seems to
try to protect the jury from misperceptions and bias, whereas we seem less concerned
with these matters for bench trials. See, for example, Fed R Evid 103(c), 403. This suggests bench trials are probably more accurate than jury trials overall or at least not less
accurate as a general matter.

It may be, however, that we believe juries are less likely to falsely convict compared
to bench trials. It is not entirely clear why we would believe this if we think bench trials are generally more accurate. Perhaps the argument is that judges are more biased
against defendants than a jury of the defendant's peers as judges tend to be in quite a
different socio-economic strata as compared to most defendants. See Hans and Vidmar,
cited above in this footnote (noting that "[f]or criminal trials the pattern disagreement
shows that the jury was usually more lenient toward the defendant than was the
judge."); Pnina Lahav, The Chicago ConspiracyTrial: Characterand JudicialDiscretion, 71 U Colo L Rev 1327, 1340 (2000). There may be some empirical evidence supporting the differing rates of false convictions. See generally Kalven and Zeisel, cited
above in this note. Perhaps this is true, but when phrased this way it appears more
consistent with concerns about rent-seeking. This is because this suggests that
judges as a group may discriminate (i.e., use the criminal process) against criminal defendants as a group. If so, then this justification squares well with a rent-seeking approach. Also even if jury trials result in fewer false convictions and more false acquittals than bench trials the issue is raised about whether the asymmetry is desirable for
the same reason that the reasonable doubt standard may be too severe on traditional
error cost grounds.
"I See Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 796 (1969) (noting that the rationale for
double jeopardy includes the policy against allowing multiple prosecutions that will
enhance the possibility that the innocent may be found guilty). We should note (again)
this assumes it is not easy for prosecutors to find alternative charges to use-a matter
made more likely as criminalization of conduct increases. See Stuntz, 100 Mich L Rev
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Jeopardydoctrineis to preventprosecutorsfrom substitutingtoward
successive prosecutions in order to avoid fundamental single-trial
proceduralconstraintssuch as the reasonable-doubtrule. This proposition explains puzzles in Double Jeopardy doctrine as well as its
overall structure.
The "puzzles" in Double Jeopardy doctrine have been set out with
remarkable clarity by Akhil Amar. 112 One of the key doctrinal tensions
3
he notes is between the decisions in Blockburger v. United States"
and Diaz v. United States." 4 Blockburger established the principle
that, for Double Jeopardy purposes, a greater offense is treated as the
same as each of its lesser-included offenses. Thus, under the Blockburgertest it would be a violation of the Double Jeopardy rule to retry
an individual for murder after that individual is acquitted on a charge
of attempted murder (arising from the same set of facts). 5 However,
in Diaz the Court permitted an individual to be retried for murder, after having been convicted of attempted murder, in a case in which the
victim died after the first trial from injuries received in the initial attack.116 Under a strict application of the Blockburger test, Diaz would
have to be considered a mistake.
The tension between Blockburger and Diaz (and between Blockburger and several other decisions) appears to be a puzzle under the
approach urged by Amar, which would apply the rule of Blockburger
strictly to the facts of Diaz. However, under the anti-substitution
thesis implied by our framework, there is no tension between Blockburger and Diaz.Blockburgerprohibits a particular substitution strategy: the use of a later trial on either a greater or lesser-included offense
in order to take two shots at convicting a defendant on one particular
set of facts. The "Diaz exception" (if one wishes to call it that) applies
to the case in which there is clearly no evidence that the prosecutor
has adopted such a strategy. Blockburger and Diaz are easily reconciled under the anti-substitution principle.
Consider another puzzle under Blockburger. Suppose one charge
consists of circumstances A, B, and C, and another of the circumstances A, B, and E. To use Amar's example, suppose one charge is
at 509-15 (cited in note 46). We are examining the core function of double jeopardy
which arose at a time of lesser criminalization than today
'12 See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L J 1807
(1997).
113284 US 299 (1932).
"14 223 US 442 (1912). As Amar notes, the principle of Diaz was affirmed later by
the Supreme Court in Garretv United States, 471 US 773 (1985). See Amar, 106 Yale
L J at 1813 (cited in note 112).
"' See Amar, 106 Yale L J at 1813 (cited in note 112).
116The state was prepared to offset against the murder sentence time served under
the attempted murder conviction. See id.
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robbery and the other is murder, arising from the same set of events,
and element B requires proof of the defendant's presence at the scene
of the crime.117 The defendant is tried under the ABC charge first, and
the government loses because it cannot prove element B. Can the government turn around and bring the ABE charge? Blockburger would
seem to imply that the answer is yes, because the charges do not involve the same elements. However, the Supreme Court held in Ashe
v. Swenson that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government
was collaterally estopped from attempting to prove element B in the
second prosecution.'

18

The tension between Blockburger and Ashe disappears under this
paper's anti-substitution principle. If prosecutors were free to split up
their charges into separate yet overlapping bundles-A, B, C}; {A, B,
E}; tB, C, D}-without having to fear that they would be barred by the
Double Jeopardy rule, then this would clearly be a desirable way of
skirting the single-trial constraints imposed by the reasonable-doubt
rule. It follows that Double Jeopardy doctrine should be understood
to prevent this kind of prosecution stratagem. If the Blockburger doctrine is read to incorporate the anti-substitution rule proposed here,
then there is no apparent conflict between Blockburger and the collateral estoppel rule of Ashe.
Our claim that the overall structure of Double Jeopardy doctrine is
consistent with the model of this paper is supported by three other aspects of the doctrine: the asymmetry of appeal rights, the treatment
of mistrials, and the application of Double Jeopardy to civil suits by
government agencies.
Consider, first, the treatment of appeal rights. In Kepner v. U.S., the
Supreme Court held that appeal rights are asymmetric,' 19 in the sense
that the defense generally can appeal any conviction, but the prosecution's right to appeal acquittals is severely limited. 120 On its face,

this rule seems like it might reduce the number of false convictions
and increase the number of false acquittals relative to symmetric appeal rights because it denies the prosecution the ability to correct
false acquittals at the trial level, while also denying the prosecution
17 See Amar, 106 Yale L J at 1827 (cited in note 112).
11 397 US 436 (1970); for discussion see Amar, 106 Yale L J at 1827-28 (cited in
note 112).
"9 See Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 105 (1904).
120See Sanabriav UnitedStates, 437 US 54, 64 (1978) (holding that even if legal rulings on the exclusion of evidence leading to acquittals were erroneous the prosecution
could not appeal); Fong Foo v United States, 369 US 141, 143 (1962) (holding that the
prosecution could not appeal an acquittal where the judge, who lacked the authority
to do so, directed a verdict of acquittal before the prosecutor has rested his case); Carroll v United States, 354 US 394, 400 (1956); United States vBall, 163 US 662 (1896)
(holding that a defendant may not be prosecuted more than once for an offense).
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the ability to turn correct acquittals into false convictions through
the appeals and retrial process. 121 However, on closer inspection, this
is not necessarily the case. Not only are the above mentioned effects
possible, but so are countervailing effects. For example, by giving the
prosecution only one shot at obtaining a conviction we provide the
prosecution with an incentive to increase spending in the initial trial,
which could increase the number of false convictions in the initial
trial. 122 The net effect is most likely ambiguous and small. 23 Thus,
the effects of asymmetric appeal rights on false convictions are ambiguous as a theoretical matter.1 2 4 Similar arguments suggest that
125
false acquittal effects are likely to be small and ambiguous.
In light of this, it seems doubtful that traditional error-cost arguments provide a solid basis for asymmetric appeal rights. However, if
we incorporate concerns over rent-seeking then a stronger rationale
for asymmetric appeal rights emerges. 126 The asymmetric appeal rights
rule of Kepner has the effect of making the jury's initial determination of acquittal final. By denying prosecutors the option to have a jury's
acquittal determination reviewed by an appellate court, the Kepner
asymmetry rule enhances the power of the jury relative to that of the
prosecutor.1 27 Given the unanimity requirement and the jury's composition after the defendant's challenges, the Kepner rule increases
the difficulty facing any prosecutor who mounts a selective enforcement campaign.
Justice Holmes's dissent in Kepner is instructive largely because of
his theory for asymmetric appeal rights. Holmes argued that the majority's decision in Kepner made no sense if understood as a rule preventing retrials, because some retrials would occur following a successful defense appeal of a conviction.' 28 However, the desirability of
preventing retrials is an incomplete and inadequate rationale for the
decision in Kepner. The theory we advance provides a superior rationale: the Double Jeopardy rule is not designed for the sole purpose
of controlling or preventing retrials; its purpose is to prevent prose121See
122

Khanna, 82 BU L Rev at 360-63 (cited in note 21).
See id at 374-83.

"2
124

See id.
Note that given that there are few acquittals (both in symmetric and asymmet-

ric appeal rights jurisdictions) and that in those countries where the prosecutor is allowed to appeal they do so infrequently, one suspects that the false convictions reducing or increasing effects are likely to be small because few resources are being saved by
prohibiting the few prosecutorial appeals that might arise under symmetric appeal
rights. See id at 33 n 120, 39-40.
'2 See id at 47-48.
'126
See id at 68-70.
127Compare Westen and Drubel, 1978 S Ct Econ Rev at 122-55 (cited in note 21) (discussing the role of jury nullification in the context of asymmetric appeal rights).
128See Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 134-35 (Holmes dissenting) (1903).
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cutors from successfully implementing a selective enforcement policy. This is a greater concern when prosecutors appeal as compared to
when defendants appeal. A regime in which prosecutors could appeal
acquittals ad infinitum would be much more vulnerable to selective
29
enforcement pressures than one where they could not.
The treatment of mistrials is another area of Double Jeopardy doctrine that shows a concern for constraining prosecutorial abuse. The
kind of abuse we are concerned with here is that the prosecution may
think, at some point in the initial trial, that a conviction is not likely
and may then try to have a mistrial declared by the court to try to get
another shot at the defendant. 30 If we permitted the prosecution to
do this and bring another trial then the prosecution would have a
tremendous incentive to have mistrials declared whenever it thought
it might not win the initial trial. This potential would, in turn, increase the incentive to engage in selective enforcement, which in1
duces rent-seeking.13
The law appears to reflect these concerns in the way it addresses
whether another trial will be permitted following a mistrial. One
could characterize the law's approach to this problem as one that depends greatly on the defense's attitude towards a mistrial. Thus, if the
defense seeks or does not oppose a motion for a mistrial then the
prosecution will normally be permitted to bring another suit.132 This
is consistent with our substitution thesis because if the defense is
seeking a mistrial, the prosecution is not likely to be using the mistrial process to seek another trial to go after the defendant.1 33 An exception to this is observed where the defense seeks a mistrial based
on something the prosecution did that appears deliberately calcu134
lated by the prosecution to induce the defense to seek a mistrial.
129 See Lockhart v Nelsen, 488 US 33, 42 (1988); Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 82, 91

(1978); United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 91 (1978). This is similar to the argument in
note 82.
130See Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 447 (1970); Stephen Schulhofer, Jeopardy and
Mistrials, 125 U Pa L Rev 449, 468-69 (1977).
131This concern is very similar to that discussed in the context of asymmetric appeal rights. At the same time if we never permitted the prosecution to bring another
trial after a mistrial we would give the defendant a great deal of strategic power to inject matters that might lead to a mistrial when a conviction appears likely. See generally Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Mystery of Mistrials (Draft).
132See United States v DiFrancesco,449 US 117, 130 (1980); see also Oregon v
Kennedy, 456 US 667, 676 (1982).
133See Schulhofer, 125 U Pa L Rev at 468-69 (cited in note 130).
'34 See Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497, 508 (1978); United States v Dinitz, 424
US 600, 611 (1976) (stating that "[the Double Jeopardy law] bar retrials where 'badfaith' conduct by judge or prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions [or] a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant; [W]here
a defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety
designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred"); United States v
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This is also consistent with the rent-seeking framework because in
such cases there is a clear risk that the prosecutor could have induced
the defense's motion for a mistrial in order take advantage of infor35
mation gleaned from the initial trial.
On the other hand, when the defense opposes a mistrial motion
the courts have adopted a more cautious stance to permitting another
trial-the prosecution must prove a "manifest necessity" for the next
trial.'3 6 In addition, the factors that go to showing whether "manifest

necessity" is present appear to be designed to ascertain whether the
prosecutor was trying to abuse the criminal process-e.g., by getting
a mistrial in order to avoid a loss in the initial trial.' 37 For example, a
hung jury leading to a mistrial does not present the same specter of
potential abuse as does the injection of prejudicial error by the prosecutor to obtain a mistrial. 138 In the former case the prosecution is
often granted another trial while the latter case will normally not
result in another trial.139 Further, when the reason for the mistrial
was a move by the defense, without prosecutorial provocation, then
the scope for prosecutorial abuse is also low and another trial is usually granted. 140 These factors are all consistent with an approach that
seeks to constrain the prosecutor's ability to substitute successive
prosecutions in order to avoid the effect of pro-defendant procedural
protections.141
Jorn, 400 US 470, 485 (1971) (stating that "It~hus, where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error").
13- See Commonwealth v Starks, 416 A2d 498, 500 (Pa 1980) (arguing that prosecutorial overreaching ".... signals the breakdown of the integrity of the judicial proceeding, and represents the type of prosecutorial tactic which the double jeopardy clause
was designed to protect against."). This exception to the bar on the application of
double jeopardy where a defendant seeks a mistrial is a very narrow one. See Green v
United States, 451 US 929, 931 (1981 )(Marshall dissenting) (stating that "I suspect that
a defendant seeking to prevent a retrial will seldom be able to prove the Government's
actual motivation!'). Few courts have found intentional prosecutorial inducement. See
Commonwealth v Warfield, 227 A2d 177 (Pa 1967)(defendant was indicted for murder
and voluntary manslaughter and the trial judge suppressed the defendant's confession,
yet the District Attorney revealed in his opening statement that the defendant had
made a confession to the police. After the defendant moved for a mistrial the District
Attorney admitted that he sought to induce the defendant to seek a mistrial).
136 See Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497, 505 (1978); Wayne R. LaFave, et al, Criminal Procedure 1176-80 (Thompson/West 3d ed 2000).
'37 See Schulhofer, 125 U Pa L Rev at 468-69 (cited in note 130).
131See Steinglass, 31 Ind L Rev at 361 (cited in note 21).
139Id at 487.
140See Dressler, UnderstandingCriminalProcedureat 607 (cited in note 3).
"I See Schulhofer, 125 U Pa L Rev at 454 (cited in note 130) (noting that "... reprosecution may be barred even though no adjudication results from the first proceed-
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Finally, consider the on-going debate about whether Double Jeopardy protections should apply to nominally "civil" suits brought by
government agencies that otherwise appear "punitive.' 1 42 The courts
have generally not permitted Double Jeopardy protections to apply to
nominally "civil" suits, however, if it can be shown that the "civil"
suit is in reality a form of "punishment" then Double Jeopardy protections may apply 43 The courts seem to rely on the following factors to determine if a "civil" suit is in reality "punishment":
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to
44
the alternative purpose assigned to it.
Consistent with our hypothesis, these seven factors appear to be
designed to prevent law enforcement agents from substitutingcivil
for criminal prosecution as a means of avoiding the Double Jeopardy
rule.145 Indeed, rather than announcing a seven factor test, courts could
clarify the doctrine in this area by saying that its purpose is to prevent
ing. The doctrine thus provides more meaningful protection against the danger of governmental harassment and the burden of repeated trials...."). Schulhofer also makes
the point that 'A number of courts have barred retrial even when mistrial was triggered
by absence of the defendant, impermissible cross-examination, or persistently objectionable behavior by defense counsel." See Schulhofer, 125 U Pa L Rev at 484 (cited in
note 130).
142See generally Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve CriminalLaw Objectives: Understandingand Transcendingthe CriminalCivil Law Distinction,42 Hastings L J 1325 (1997). See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L J 1795,
1797, 1869-73 (1992).
'13 See United States v Halper,490 US 435,449 (1989); US v Ward, 448 US 242, 24849(1980).
4 Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99 (1997); Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez,
372 US 144, 168-69 (1963).
'4' Some of the other factors (e.g., scienter, historically regarded as punishment)
may work as proxies for the kind of stigma associated with the particular civil wrong.
See Cheh, 42 Hastings L J at 1352-54 (cited in note 142). If the wrong appears like what
most people consider criminal then the stigma may be quite high thereby giving the
prosecutor greater ability to extract wealth. The fourth and fifth factors suggest that
one important purpose for the doctrine in this area is to discourage enforcement agents
from substituting civil enforcement for criminal enforcement in order to evade the procedural protections that come along with criminal enforcement. See id at 1345, 135457, 1394.
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the prosecution from gaining through the adoption of such a substitution strategy.

B. Ex Post Facto Clause
The ex post facto clause bars retroactive application of certain changes
in the criminal law.146 The standard justifications are that it provides
notice to defendants of the conduct that is illegal and the sanction for
it, as well as constrainingthe government from passing arbitrary or
vindictive legislation against a particular defendant. 41 The prohibition is only concerned with matters that amount to "punishment"' 14 8
and applies more frequently in the context of legislative decisions as
1 49
compared to judicial decisions.
Given that a concern for potential government oppression has always been one of the justifications for the ex post facto clause, the key
contribution of the rent-seeking framework is its identification of
a particular justification as central to efforts to understand case outcomes. The two standard justifications, notice and prevention of abuse,
provide alternate approaches to explaining the case law. Under the
notice approach, just about every change in the criminal punishment
process, whether in the law or in evidentiary requirements, could violate the prohibition against ex post facto rules if applied retroactively. Under the "abuse" orrent-seekingapproach,only those changes
in the punishment process that create a potential for abuse, by increasing the risk of targeted enforcement, should be deemed violations of the expost facto clause. The case law, as we shall see, is more
consistent with the latter view.
Traditionally the ex post facto rule applies in the four contexts set
out in Calder v. Bull. 15 These are: (1) when the legislature creates a
new criminal law it may not be applied retroactively to behavior that
146See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw 428 (West 5th
ed 1995); Lindsey v Washington, 301 US 397 (1937).
147See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 97-100 (West 2d ed
1986).
"I Sometimes "civil" sanctions may amount to "punishment" for purposes of ex
post facto inquiry. See Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244 (1994) (finding that
the punitive damage awards of the 1991 Civil Rights Act were similar enough to criminal sanctions to apply the ex post facto clause). However, this is not a frequent occurrence so that normally the legislative label is determinative (i.e., if it is labeled "civil"
by the legislature then it will most likely not amount to "punishment"). See Kansas v
Hendricks, 521 US 346 (1997).
149This is because the prohibition appears in Art. I of the U.S. Constitution, which
deals with legislative power and not in Art. HI, which deals with judicial power. See
LaFave and Scott, CriminalLaw at 97-100 (cited in note 147).
1s0 See Calderv Bull, 3 US 386 (1978).
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was not criminal at the time the behavior occurred; (2) when the legislature removes elements from the definition of a crime or otherwise
increases the severity of a crime (making it a more serious crime than
when it occurred) these changes may not be applied retroactively; (3)
when the legislature increases the punishment for a particular crime
then this change may not be applied retroactively; and (4) when the
legislature changes the rules of evidence or changes the requirements
for testimony relative to what they were when the act occurred then
the changes may not be applied retroactively' 5' Contexts (2) and (3)
are often considered as one. 5 2 Contexts (1)through (4) represent fairly
common methods in which prosecutors and the government could
5 3
engage in selective or targeted enforcement or legislation.
"I' See
12

id at 390.

See LaFave and Scott, CriminalLaw at 97 n 3 (cited in note 147); Nowak and Ro-

tunda, ConstitutionalLaw at 428 (cited in note 146). The ex post facto prohibition will
also be violated in some other situations. See Beazell v Ohio, 269 US 167 (1925); Kring
v Missouri, 107 US 221 (1882) (noting that "the new Constitution of Missouri does
take away what, [by] the law of the State when the crime was committed, was a good
defense to the charge of murder in the first degree."); Thompson v Utah, 170 US 343
(1898) (arguing that "the provision in the constitution of Utah providing for the trial in
courts of general jurisdiction of criminal cases, not capital, by a jury composed of eight
persons, is ex post facto in its application to felonies committed before the Territory
became a State, because, in respect of such crimes, the Constitution of the United States
gave the accused, at the time of the commission of his offence, the right to be tried by
a jury of twelve persons, and made it impossible to deprive him of his liberty except by
the unanimous verdict of such a jury").
113Context (1) is seldom brought into question in modern times, but it still represents the quintessential instance of the ex post facto prohibition-where the government and the prosecutor could target a particular defendant in response to some political, or other gain, they may receive. See LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law at 98 (cited
in note 147). Contexts (2) and (3) still arise in some form in modern times. See Stogner
v California,539 US 607 (2003); Dobbert v Florida, 432 US 282 (1977); Hernandez v
State, 43 Ariz 424 (1934); Lindsey v Washington, 301 US 397 (1937). They also represent instances, like Context (1), where prosecutors could engage in selective or targeted enforcement. Context (4) involves instances where changes in the standard of
proof and rules of evidence are applied retroactively. See Walker v State, 433 So2d 469
(Ala 1983); Plachy v State, 239 SW 979 (1922); Thompson v Missouri, 171 US 380
(1898); LaFave and Scott, CriminalLaw at 97-101 (cited in note 147). One of the old
English cases establishing this point involved a defendant that had convinced a coconspirator in treason to flee the country. See T Macaulay, 9 History of England 31,
171-73 (Penguin 1899). The English Parliament responded by reducing the number of
witnesses needed to convict for treason, which was held to violate the ex post facto prohibition. See id at 270. This case fits into our approach as it involves an instance where
the legislature changed the law in order to target a particular defendant.
In the older cases any change (whether to increase or decrease the punishment) might
have violated ex post facto if applied retroactively. See In Re TYson, 13 Colo 482 (1889);
Commonwealth v McDonough, 95 Mass 581 (1866). However, now that has changed
so that a decrease in punishment is unlikely to violate ex post facto. See US v Stewart,
1993 US App Lexis 17634, *10, 1993 WL 265147, **3 (10th Cir 1993) (noting that "the

102

A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure

The modern case law presents more difficult issues. For example,
what happens when the government passes a law that changes parole requirements or privileges? In CaliforniaDept. of Correctionsv.
Morales15 4 the California State government changed the rule (contained in a statute) on reconsideration hearings for prisoners who had
their first attempt at obtaining parole rejected.'-" The old rules provided for annual reconsideration for such inmates and the new rules
provided for the parole board to defer hearings for up to three years if
the board "finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would
be granted ... during the following two years and states the basis for
its findings: ' 116 The new rule in effect changed the statutory scheme
and granted additional power and discretion to the parole board. The
Court held that this rule, when applied retroactively, did not violate
ex post facto because there was only a remote likelihood of obtaining
parole in those cases where the new rule applied.15 7 There was only a
speculative possibility of really extending the prison term through
158
this new rule.
The result in Morales is consistent with the rent-seeking model of
procedural constraints. Given the tiny risk that the change in Morales
could have resulted from or facilitated successful targeting, the rentseeking concerns behind the ex post facto clause are not seriously triggered. Although there appeared to be an increase in discretion and in
the expected sanction, it was well constrained because the board could
only defer hearings for those prisoners that had no reasonable chance
of parole. If a prisoner had little chance of parole anyway then the scope
for the new rule to encourage selective enforcement was limited. 5 9
More recent case law distinguishes between rules that affect witness competency and rules that change the quantum of evidence
needed to convict defendants. In Carmel] v. Texas, 60 the Supreme
Court held that a change in the law regarding when uncorroborated
testimony of sexual assault complainants would be admitted violates
framers of the Ex Post Facto Clause intended it to preclude only increased punishment
for preexisting criminal conduct"). See also Miller v Florida,428 US 423, 430 (1987).
15'514 US 499 (1995).
'-1 See Morales, 514 US at 501.
"-6 Id at 503.
,s7 See id at 513.
158Id at 509, 514. The Parole board was required to provide reasons for its decisions
too. Id at 511.
,59 The US Supreme Court has recently upheld the Morales decision in Garner v
Jones, 529 US 244 (2000). The facts in Garnerare similar to Morales in that the parole
board was able to delay hearings on parole as a result of a regulatory amendment (not
a statutory change as in Morales). See id at 248-53. The Court remanded and required
a finding on whether there was a "significant risk" under Morales. See id at 255.
,60 See Carmell v Texas, 529 US 513 (2000).
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the ex post facto clause if applied retroactively' 6 1 Prior to the change
in the law, Texas required that the testimony of sexual assault complainants be corroborated unless the complainant- was under the
age of fourteen.16 2 After the defendant's alleged wrongdoing the law
changed so that uncorroborated testimony of any complainant below eighteen years of age would be acceptable. 163 The prosecution
attempted to use this law because during the relevant time the complainant was between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. 64 The Court
held that retroactively using the new law violated the ex post facto
prohibition because it reduced the quantum of evidence necessary to
convict the defendant. 65 The decision ran counter to Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 66 where the Court held that a change in the law that
permitted the prosecution to present the evidence of witnesses convicted of felonies was not a violation of ex post facto even if applied
67
retroactively. 1
Although Carmell and Hopt are quite difficult to reconcile under
the notice theory of the ex post facto clause, they can be reconciled
under the rent-seeking model. If our concern is with the ability of the
prosecutor to use certain changes in the law of evidence to increase
the chance of abuse of the criminal process then the Hopt and Carmell
contexts present differing risks of abuse. In Hopt the prosecution is
being permitted to use testimony of those who have committed
felonies. Given that a witness's prior record may be used in court to
challenge his testimony it is not clear that permitting felons to testify greatly increases prosecutorial discretion. This evidence may be
important, but the jury or the judge will be inclined to discount a
felon's testimony. 68 In the Carmell context, obtaining the testimony
of the complainant is obviously important to the prosecutor's case.
161See

id at 552.

162Id at 517.
'63

Id at 518.

164Id at 519.
16sSee

id at 532-33.

166110 US
167See

574 (1884).
id at 589.

168One could, of course, posit instances where such abuse may occur (e.g., the prosecution offering a felon, who is currently in jail, a reduced sanction in some manner
for fabricating testimony), but one suspects that the risk is either not great or that the
testimony would not be generally believed. See Joshua M. Levinson and Brian Lambert,
Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 88 Geo L J 1175 (2000) (discussing government's disclosure obligations). Note that the Hopt decision concerned
a law that related to permitting all felons' testimony (even those not in jail and hence
not subject to as much prosecutorial arm-twisting) so that the threat of prosecutors'
using their power against this general group to extract false testimony is not entirely
persuasive. See Hopt, 110 US at 588. The facts of Hopt involved a felon in prison at the
time, but the rule was not limited to those instances. See id at 589.

104

A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure

Increasing the prosecutor's discretion with regard to this type of testimony gives the prosecutor and other parties considerably greater
room to use the system to their advantage.16 9 Thus, the change in
Carmell makes it significantly easier to credibly threaten to convict
a defendant, whereas the change in Hopt may only increase this risk
slightly.' 70 The potential for abuse is greater in Carmell than in the
Hopt context. 171
A. Some Other Measures That Constrain Rent-Seeking
In this Part we address two areas of recent controversy-void-forvagueness and entrapment doctrine.
1. Void-for-vagueness
The void-for-vagueness doctrine serves as a constraint on legislators
and law enforcement agents that curtails their discretion. The early
cases struck down laws that were deemed vague, in the sense that they
granted law enforcement agents broad discretion in deciding what is
legal and what is not. 7 2 Such discretion gives enforcement agents
wide power to extract wealth through the criminal law enforcement
process. This raises the specter of rent-seeking.
More recently a new twist to the issue of vague statutes has arisen:
what happens when the group against which selective enforcement
may be used agrees to it or supports it? This is the situation that gave
rise to the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago v. Morales.7 3 The case
developed after Chicago passed an ordinance that prevented "criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or with other
persons in any public place.' ' 7 4 The definition of loitering was quite
broad-"(remaining] in any one place with no apparent purpose"'1and police were required to ascertain whether some (at least one of
169

See Carmell,529 US at 546.

170See id.
7 1 Note that we have only argued that the potential for abuse is greater in Carmell
than Hopt not necessarily that Hopt was correctly decided-for that to be the case we
would need to believe that the potential for abuse in Hopt was below the threshold,
whatever it might be, that is needed to trigger ex post facto prohibitions. We make no
comment on that at this stage except to argue that there is a difference in abuse potentials between the cases. Also we make no comment on where the threshold for triggering ex post facto prohibitions should/might be.
12 Papachristouv City of Jacksonville,405 US 156 (1972); Fields v City of Omaha,
810 F2d 830 (8th Cir 1987).
527 US 41 (1999).

114Id
11 Id

at 45-46.
at 47 & n 2.
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two) persons who were loitering were gang members. The ordinance,
it was argued, had the support of the communities in which it was
most likely to be enforced, the high-crime urban neighborhoods of
Chicago.17 6 In spite of the claimed community support, the Supreme
77
Court held the ordinance unenforceable on vagueness grounds.
In light of the broad grant of discretion to the police under Chicago's
anti-gang ordinance it is obviously possible that the police could engage in selective enforcement. 78 The community may have consented
to this risk in order to enhance its security. 7 9 The general question
raised by Morales is whether a community should be allowed to make
this trade off.
Some scholars have argued for an exception to the void-for-vagueness
doctrine on the ground that selective enforcement or targeting is extremely unlikely in the Morales context.1 0 Specifically, the use of an
anti-gang ordinance to oppress a particular group, or transfer wealth
from one group to another, is extremely unlikely in the Morales setting for two reasons. First, the ordinance, arguably, had a high degree
of community support even within the neighborhoods most likely to
be burdened by its enforcement.' 8' Second, the costs of selective enforcement probably would have been internalized within the relevant
communities. 8 2 Put another way, this case is unlike the example of
selective law enforcement in the Jim-Crow South, which involved the
use (or non-use) of force by a politically dominant group to oppress a
politically marginal group. The communities that supported the antigang ordinance made an apparently conscious decision to trade off
protection from police harassment in order to reduce the crime rate in
their neighborhoods. The general implication of this argument is that
constitutional restraints on criminal law enforcement should be relaxed in settings where the risk of selective enforcement is minimal.
For simplicity, we will refer to this as the internalization critique.
176Id at

74 (Scalia dissenting) ("[mlany residents of the inner city felt that they were
prisoners in their own homes .... Chicagoans decided that to eliminate the problem
it was worth restricting some of the freedom they once enjoyed.").
177See Morales, 514 US at 51.
171See id at 58-59.
179See id at 74 (Scalia dissenting) (stating that "[tihe minor limitation upon the free
state of nature that is the prophylactic arrangement imposed upon all Chicagoans
seemed to them (and it seems to me) a small price to pay for liberation of their streets").
10 See Tracey L Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197.
181See id; Morales, 514 US at 74 (Scalia dissenting) (stating that "(t~he minor limitation upon the free state of nature that is the prophylactic arrangement imposed upon
all Chicagoans seemed to them (and it seems to me) a small price to pay for liberation
of their streets").
182This seems implicit in Justice Scalia's approach. See Morales, 514 US at 74.
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The framework of this paper provides an alternative to the internalization critique, as well as a justification for Morales. The internalization critique misses an important feature of pro-defendant
procedural protections. Not only do they dampen temptation for
selective enforcement, or inter-group wealth expropriation, they also
cut down the prospects for what we have termed "simple corruption." That is, procedural protections also have the function of reducing the opportunities for an individual enforcement agent to enrich
himself by, for example, using his position to bully individuals who
can be threatened with arbitrary arrest and punishment. This is potentially just as harmful as inter-group wealth extraction, because
as long as it is possible for individuals to enrich themselves through
the enforcement process, people will devote resources to acquiring
positions as enforcement agents. Each position along the chain of enforcement (from the officer on the street to his immediate superiors,
to prosecutors, to parole officers) could become a source of monopoly
profits for the individuals who occupy them. 8 3 When this occurs on
a large scale, consistency and impartiality in enforcement are un4
likely to be observed.18
2. Entrapment
The fact that the entrapment defense is a relatively new common
law doctrine probably has a lot to do with the expanding scope of
183This is essentially the argument made in the context of a vertically fragmented
enforcement scheme. See text accompanying note 63.
1"4 In addition to this argument it should be noted that the factual predicates of the
case-that the minority dominated community supported this measure and hence was
willing to trade off civil rights for enhanced safety-is a fairly contentious matter.
First, there is significant debate over whether the community did actually support
these measures. See Richard R.W Brooks, Fearand Fairnessin the City: CriminalEnforcement and Perceptionsof Fairnessin Minority Communities, 73 S Cal L Rev 1219
(2000). The support seems to be equivocal. See id at 1233-35. Second, even if the community did support this measure, it does not tell us too much about how much the
community is willing to trade rights for safety. See id at 1262 (noting that ". . . if poor
blacks are more supportive of the American legal system because they are less aware
of the existence of race-based unfairness. . . , then a desire or willingness on their part
to expand legal enforcement in poor urban communities is not a fully informed position for lawmakers to follow."). All it says is (assuming the community did support the
measure) that the community preferred this mix of safety and civil rights over the current one. It does not tell us that this option would have been preferred over others that
were not offered to the community. Indeed, it is possible that other alternatives could
have been preferred by the community to the ordinance or the current state of affairs.
Community support therefore only tells us so much. See id at 1271. Finally, even if the
community did support this ordinance over all others that does little to address concerns with the prosecutors' now enhanced power to extract wealth.
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The defense does not exist for common law

crimes, such as murder.18 6 This is a sensible result because even
those who commit murder as a result of inducement, cajolery, or solicitation are still likely to present a danger to society.' 87 The defense
is connected today largely with drug prosecutions and other "victimless" crimes. 188
Our theory provides a rationale for the entrapment defense and for
its relatively recent appearance in the law. Entrapment's recent appearance in connection with new prohibitions can be understood as
a reaction to the rent-seeking hazards associated with expanding
criminal prohibitions. The short list of common law crimes encompasses conduct that is uniformly considered undesirable. 89 It is possible, as we have argued, for enforcement agents to enforce them selectively, but there are many procedural protections in existence to
constrain this incentive. Relatively new criminal prohibitions, on the
other hand, often encompass conduct that is not uniformly considered undesirable, and may quite easily be made the basis for selective
enforcement. 90 Consider, for example, the debates concerning the
more severe punishments for crack cocaine, heavily used in minority
" See Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts concurring) (noting that "[tihe increasing frequency of the assertion that defendant was trapped is
doubtless due to the creation by statute of many new crimes, (e.g., sale and transportation of ...narcotics) and the correlative establishment of special enforcement
bodies for the detection and punishment of offenders").
186See Lafave and Scott, CriminalLaw at 421-22 (cited in note 147); see also Model
Penal Code § 2.13 (noting that the defense of entrapment is unavailable when "causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense").
"I See Model Penal Code § 2.13, Comment at 420 (1985) (noting that "one who can
be persuaded to cause such injury presents a danger that the public cannot safely disregard").
188See Dana M. Todd, In Defense of the OutrageousGovernment Conduct Defense
in the Federal Courts, 84 Ky L Rev 415, 419 (1995); John E Pries, Witch Doctors and
Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52 Vand L Rev
1869, 1872 (1999).
18 These common-law crimes are mala in se, or morally wrong acts. These crimes
are distinguished from mala prohibitacrimes, which are acts made criminal by statute,
but are not of themselves considered criminal. See Black's Law Dictionary 956 (6th ed
1990). One argument in support of excluding the entrapment defense from conduct
uniformly considered criminal is that, "from a moral perspective, it is wrong to punish those.., who lack an opportunity to know and adhere to the law due to government conduct." John T Parry, Culpability,Mistake and Official Interpretationsof Law,
25 Am J Crim L 1, 5-6 (1997).
190
See Sorrells, 287 US at 453 (Roberts concurring) (noting that "efforts... to obtain arrests and convictions (of these crimes) have too often been marked by reprehensible methods!'). See also Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 Cal L Rev 943, 970 (1999).
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neighborhoods, relative to powdered cocaine. 19' As a positive matter,
then, we should expect to observe, and we have observed, the entrapment defense expanding in scope and gaining a stronger footing in
criminal law doctrine as the scope of criminal prohibitions extends
beyond basic common law crimes.
One rationale provided for the entrapment defense is that it enables courts to avoid becoming tainted by condoning inappropriate
conduct, or "abhorrent transaction(s)."' 92 The rationales could be expanded to include the claim that it discourages police officers from
engaging in inappropriate conduct because it effectively denies them
193
the reward (in terms of prosecutions) for engaging in such conduct.
This rationale has been criticized as inadequate on the ground that the
purity of the courts, or of enforcement agents, has no particular value
in itself. 194 If some impurity enhances deterrence, why not allow it?
The justification suggested by this paper's framework avoids this
problem. The function of the entrapment defense is not simply to
protect the purity of enforcement agents, but to dampen rent-seeking
incentives at lower levels of the enforcement process. If enforcement
agents are denied the fruit of entrapment efforts, the rewards from
using the law enforcement process to target specific individuals or
groups fall.
VIII.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

We ran a regression of Transparency International's corruption index
on several variables, including measures of key pro-defendant criminal procedural rules. The reasoning behind this exercise is that if prodefendant criminal procedural rules reduce the incentives to use the
criminal laws for inter-group wealth extraction and for personal enrichment, the degree of corruption should be lower in countries that
have such procedural rules.
The key measures of pro-defendant rules used in the regression
analysis are the existence of a rule prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and the existence of a common law system. The common
'91 See United States v Anderson, 82 F3d 436 (DC Cir 1996); United States v
Sanchez, 81 F3d 9 (1st Cir 1996) (holding that increased sentencing for possession of
crack rather that powdered cocaine was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness).

192Sorrells, 287 US at 459 (Roberts concurring).
'93

See id at 448.

194The majorities in Sorells and Sherman used a subjective test in applying the entrapment defense (focusing on the defendant's predisposition for crime and mental
state), rather than focusing on the action of government and law enforcement officials.
See Sorrells, 287 US at 451; Sherman v United States, 356 US 369, 375-76 (1958). See

also Jason R. Schulze, United States v Tucker: Can the Sixth Circuit Really Abolish
the OutrageousGovernment Conduct Defense?, 45 DePaul L Rev 943 (1996).
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law system represents a greater degree of pro-defendant bias in its
criminal procedures than civil law systems (e.g. the reasonable-doubt
standard, certain aspects of Double Jeopardy, certain rules on Jury
Trials). The results, in Section A, suggest that both types of prodefendant protection are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of corruption. In other words, the presence of these protections
is correlated with low corruption. We address caveats with this part
of our analysis in Section B and suggest that our results should be
seen as preliminary empirical support for our theory.
Transparency International's 1997 "Corruption Perceptions Index"
provides a score ranging from 10 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt) for
roughly eighty countries. The index, which measures international
perceptions of corruption (bribe-taking and bribe-paying), is based on
a survey of business people and analysts. 195 Our measure for the existence of a pro-defendant bias in criminal procedure is simply coding
for whether the country has a common law system. In general and
very roughly, common law legal regimes appear to have a stronger prodefendant bias than civil law regimes due in part to the presence of the
reasonable-doubt standard, right to a jury trial, and certain aspects of
Double Jeopardy amongst others. 196 The cruel and unusual punishment measurement is reflected by two "dummy variables." One variable, Crupun3, takes the value one if the country either does not have
a rule prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment (e.g., Malaysia), or
does not abide by the rule if it has one (e.g., Cameroon). 197 The other
"95 Our corruption index data are from 1997. The data are from surveys of business
people and may capture general levels of corruption in the country. Our interest is in
corruption in law enforcement, but we assume that corruption in law enforcement is
probably correlated with general levels of corruption in a positive manner. For information on the Corruption Perceptions Index, see <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
prddr/trans/>. See also Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Background Paper to the 2000 Corruption PerceptionsIndex (September 2000).
196 See Craig M. Bradley, CriminalProcedure:A Worldwide Study xv-xxii (Carolina
Academic 1999), for a discussion of the major differences in criminal procedure between common law and civil law systems. In civil law, or inquisitorial, systems (found
in a majority of continental European countries) a "theoretically neutral judicial officer conducts the criminal investigation and a judge ... determines guilt or innocence"
Id at xv. Common law systems (found in the United States, Great Britain and its former colonies) are based on a mistrust of the government, and "the defendant is endowed with a quiver of rights that he may launch against the government at various
stages of the proceeding." Id at xvi. The reasonable-doubt standard is one of the defendant's weapons against common law criminal systems. England, Wales, South Africa,
and the United States all require that the defendant's guilt be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. See id at 122, 349. We tried to determine whether countries differ with respect to the double jeopardy rule. We found that every country in our sample either had
a double jeopardy rule or had signed a treaty requiring compliance with such a rule.
197 In our sample, thirty-one countries fall in this category (i.e., have a rule prohibiting cruel punishment but practice it in spite of the rule). Four countries in our
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variable, Crupun2, takes the value one if the country has a rule prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, but there are some concerns expressed about the state's compliance with its own rule (e.g.,
El Salvador). 198
We also included in the regression a measure of the ratio of government spending to gross domestic product (GDP). The purpose of this
measure, labeled Ratio, is to capture the relative number of opportunities for corruption in a country. Presumably as this ratio increases,
the number of enforcement agents increases relative to the size of the
economy. For example, a country that has one licensing agent for every
business will presumably have a large ratio of government spending to
GDP, and a correspondingly large number of opportunities for bribepaying. It happens, however, that this argument is inadequate because
a country may choose to pay its licensing agents nothing (allowing
them to make up the shortfall in bribes) and then the ratio of government spending to GDP may be relatively small. Regardless, we have
included the Ratio measure as it is likely to have a substantial effect,
though the direction of the effect is unclear a priori.
A. A First Cut: Ordinary Least Squares Regression
The results in Table 1 are for an ordinary-least-squares regression of
the Corruption Perceptions Index (labeled CPI) on Ratio and the prodefendant procedure variables. The results indicate that corruption is
significantly lower where a common law system is in place.1 99 Moresample do not prohibit cruel and unusual punishment (Malaysia, Morocco, Senegal,
and Ivory Coast). We have no fixed definition of cruel and unusual punishment. For
those states that ban cruel and unusual punishment, we have taken evidence of torture
and serious physical abuse as a strong sign of the existence of such punishment. For
example, the State Department says the following of Cameroon: "The Penal Code proscribes torture, renders inadmissible in court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits
public servants from using undue force against any person; however, although President Biya also promulgated a new law in 1997 that bans torture by government officials,
there were credible reports that security forces continued to torture, beat and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees. InNew Bell and other non maximum-security penal detention centers, beatings are common and prisoners reportedly are chained and
flogged at times in their cells" See http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
1999_hrp-report/99hrp-toc.html.
198
Countries in this category have been described by the US State Department as
applying punishment methods that vary from sleep deprivation to beatings. However,
the State Department's report indicates that the abuses in these countries are either
uncommon or not serious. For the State Department's analysis, see http://www.state.gov/
www/global/human-rights/1999-hrp-report/99hrp-toc.html. Thus, the difference between Crunpun 2 and Crupun 3 is largely a matter of degree.
l9The results in Table 1 were largely replicated in a second regression that includes
a variable measuring the ratio of public sector wages to financial sector wages. In the
second regression, the COMMLAW and CRUPUN2 coefficients remained roughly the
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OLS Regression of Corruption Index on Procedural Constraints

CPI

Coef.

Std. Err.

T

P > Itl

RATIO
CRUPUN3
CRUPUN2
COMMLAW
CONS

.039
-2.997
-2.104
1.455
4.986

.022
.513
.604
.471
.730

1.800
-5.840
-3.482
3.090
6.832

0.076
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.000

Number of ohs = 75
R-squared = 0.458
Adj R-squared = 0.427

over, both measures of cruel punishment constraints indicate that
the failure to prohibit such punishment is positively correlated with
corruption. The results indicate that moving from a regime in which
there is a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment (that is complied with) to one in which there is no such prohibition (Crupun3)
reduces the Corruption index (i.e., increases corruption) by 3 points.
This is quite a substantial drop given that the maximum score is 10.
The existence of a common law system raises the Corruption index
(i.e., reduces corruption) by 1.5 points.
The substantial impact of the two variables measuring cruel punishment constraints and the common law variable were replicated in
expanded regression models (see Appendix) controlling for educational
levels (percentage at primary level), religion (percent Catholic, Muslim), and economy type (socialist, mixed). Although the coefficient for
Crupun3 fell in absolute value from 3 to 2, it remained statistically
significant and increased in proportion to the common law variable.
Interestingly, the results suggest that the cruel and unusual punishment measures have a larger impact on corruption than the commonlaw measure (which proxies for a stronger pro-defendant bias in criminal procedure). This has interesting implications for the recent
literature on common law protections and economic growth. 200 The
same. The CRUPUN3 variable dropped to statistical insignificance, but this may largely
be a byproduct of the sharp drop in observations because of missing wage date. We had
only forty-two observations for the second regression. The new variable PAFIN, which
measures the ratio of public sector to financial sector wages, came in highly significant
with a coefficient of 3.395 (t-statistic = 2.3), suggesting that the ratio of public sector
to financial sector wages is negatively associated with corruption.
2w For greater discussion see for example, Rafael LaPorta, et al, Law and Finance,
106 J Pol Econ 1113, 1151-52 (1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J Legal Stud 503 (2001J(finding results consistent with the notion that the common law leads to greater economic growth relative to civil law systems in the period 1960-1992).
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results suggest that hard constraints on the state's freedom to profit
through punishment may be a more important restriction on corruption than the existence of common law rules. The results can also be
taken as empirical verification of our claim in Part VI.B that procedural protections and penalty restrictions (e.g., the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment) work as complements with penalty
restrictions having the more powerful long run effect.
B. Problems and Extensions
The ordinary-least squares approach is arguably inappropriate for this
study, and, if so, the regression results reported in Table 1 may be biased in the sense that they fail to capture the true relationship between the corruption index and the procedural constraints. The most
important problem for this analysis is endogeneity.20 ' The ordinaryleast-squares regression carried out in Table 1 assumes that the explanatory variables (i.e., procedural constraints) are exogenous or predetermined with respect to the dependent variable (i.e., corruption).
This may not be true, however, if procedural restraints are adopted as
a response to corruption because then they are clearly not predetermined with respect to corruption. The procedural restraint variables
would then be endogenous rather than exogenous variables.
This argument presents a potentially serious issue in the case of
the cruel and unusual punishment measure used in the Table 1 regression. Some of the countries in our sample may have adopted rules
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment in order to dampen corruption. A parliament, for example, might pass such a law in order to
constrain rampant corruption in some executive branch office. This
concern is probably not serious in the case of the common law measure. It is unlikely that any of the countries in our sample would have
adopted the common law in response to corruption. Common law
regimes have appeared as the result of colonization instead of problemfocused legislation.
The standard solution to an endogenous explanatory variable problem is to find an "instrumental" variable, i.e., a variable that is correlated with the (potentially)endogenous explanatory variable and that
is not itself endogenous. 20 2 Our solution to the instrument-choice
problem is to follow the approach of Paulo Mauro in his article "Corruption and Growth'

20

3

Mauro found that an index measuring the de-

gree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization served as a good instrument
201On endogeneity, or simultaneous-equations bias, see, for example, William H.
Greene, EconometricAnalysis, 652-711 (Prentice Hall 4th ed 2000).
2D See id at 370-375 (cited in note (discussing instrumental variable regressions).
I Paulo Mauro, Corruptionand Growth, 110 Q J Econ 681 (1995).
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Table 2. Comparison of OLS and IV Regressions of Corruption Index on Procedural
Constraints
OLS Regression
CPI

Coef.

Std. Err.

T

P > Itl

RATIO2
CRUPUN

.112
-1.177

.037
.259

3.00
-4.53

0.004
0.000

.882

.471

1.80

0.077

COMMLAW

Source: Table A.4 of appendix
Instrumental Variables Regression
CPI
RATIO2
CRUPUN
COMMLAW

Coef.

Std. Err.

T

P > Itl

.010
-4.660
2.281

.097
2.329
1.351

0.10
-2.00
1.69

0.918
0.050
0.097

Source: Table A.3 of appendix

for corruption. Mauro's ethnolinguistic fractionalization instrument
measures the probability that two persons drawn at random from a
country's population will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic
group. 20 4 Following Mauro's lead, if the ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure serves as a good instrument for corruption and if corruption does cause some countries to adopt procedural restraints (e.g.,
banning cruel and unusual punishment), then the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization instrument should also serve as a good instrument
for a potentially endogenous procedural restraint measure. We therefore collapsed our cruel and unusual punishment indexes into one index (labeled Crupun) taking the values 1, 2, and 3, where the value 2
represents the level of punishment reflected in the Crupun2 index
and the value 3 represents the level of punishment reflected in the
Crupun3 index. Table 2 presents results of ordinary-least-squares and
instrumental-variables regressions of the corruption index on Crupun
and other variables shown in Table 1 (full regression results are provided in the appendix). We used the ethnolinguistic fractionalization
index for the year 1961 as the instrument.
The new results show that the instrumental variables estimate of
the coefficient for the cruel and unusual punishment index is negaSee id at 682-83.
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tive, as in the original ordinary-least-squares regression. Moreover,
the new Crupun coefficient estimate is even larger in absolute value
relative to the common law coefficient estimate. The results in the
bottom part of Table 2 suggest that the corruption index falls roughly
4 points for every increase (from 1 to 2, or from 2 to 3) in the cruel and
unusual punishment index.
These results are sufficient for our purposes. A key claim of this paper is that procedural restraints dampen corruption, and that is confirmed by all of the regression results. Of course, to the extent endogeneity is a serious issue, the instrumental variables estimates should
be viewed as the reliable ones. Moreover, the instrumental variable
results are consistent in a deeper sense with the theory of this paper.
The theory views procedural restraints as a price or tax that constrains
the demand for corruption, and also as a product of or supply-side
response to corruption. The instrumental variable results are consistent with and effectively reconcile supply and demand side theories
20 5
of the relationship between procedural constraints and corruption.
One possible criticism of our interpretation of the regression results is that the Crupun measure may simply be a reflection of the stability or effectiveness of government. An ineffective government is
likely to be corrupt. If our cruel and unusual punishment index is
simply a proxy for ineffectiveness, the correlation between the index
and government corruption may not tell us much about the relationship between criminal procedural constraints and corruption. Though
we cannot be confident that this argument is wrong, there are two
reasons to doubt it. First, as a conceptual matter, it is difficult to
2o5 The size of the "endogeneity bias" in the estimate of the Crupun coefficient is
simply the difference between the ordinary-least-squares and the instrumental-variables
estimate. Looking at Table 2 we know that the ordinary-least-squares estimate is -1.177
and the instrumental-variables estimate is -4.660, and thus the suggested endogeneity
bias is 3.483. The positive sign for the bias term is consistent with what we would expect under the traditional instrumental-variables framework. Our theory treats procedural constraints as a "price" reducing the demand for corruption. The alternative part
of the model treats past corruption as a signal or call that leads to the production of
more procedural restraints-the equivalent of a supply relationship. In the standard
demand-supply model, any estimate of the slope of the demand curve by ordinaryleast-squares will be biased upward due to movements along the supply curve caused
by exogenous disturbances (or shocks) to demand. See, for example, G.S. Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics (John Wiley 2d ed 1992); A.M. McGahan, Cooperation in
Processand Capacities: Trade Associations in Brewing After Repeal, 38 J L & Econ
521, 531-532 (1995) (providing a mathematical analysis on the effect of exogenous factors in the demand-supply function). We seem to have an equivalent result here. Exogenous disturbances in the "demand" schedule for corruption generate an upward
bias in the ordinary-least-squares estimate of the relationship between procedural restraints (as measured by Crupun) and the corruption level.
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distinguish government ineffectiveness from corruption. Indeed, one
might be inclined to think ineffectiveness results from corruption
rather than the other way around. Second, in expanded regression
models shown in the appendix we included several variables that
could be interpreted as proxies for government effectiveness. Our central results are replicated in the expanded regressions. We recognize
that more could and should be done to empirically examine the connection between corruption and criminal procedural protections (e.g.,
time series analysis). The results of this part should only be viewed as
preliminary empirical support for our theory.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The strong pro-defendant bias in criminal procedure is a stalwart of
Anglo-American law. This has seemed perplexing because it could
encourage criminal wrongdoing, whereas one of the primary reasons
for declaring something criminal is to try to severely reduce its incidence.2 0 6 This apparent contradiction has led to several attempts to
justify the pro-defendant bias in criminal procedure. Our paper develops a simple positive theory for a pro-defendant bias: to constrain
the costs associated with rent seeking in the criminal law enforcement process. The key institutional features of the punishment process (reasonable-doubt rule, penalty restrictions, the jury), the case
law on criminal procedure, and empirical evidence on international
corruption appear to be consistent with this theory.
We began by sketching some of the more common criminal procedures and examining the traditional justifications given for them. In
particular, we focused on the reasonable doubt standard and the justification commonly given for it and endorsed by the Supreme Court in
its Winship decision-that we are more concerned with the sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with false convictions than with
false acquittals. We found the traditional rationale makes implicit assumptions about the relative costs of false convictions and false acquittals that are not clearly supported by the empirical evidence.
In light of this, we suggested that the pro-defendant bias can be
better explained as a means to constrain costs associated with rentseeking along with traditional error cost concerns. Absent some constraint, prosecutors and other agents would use the criminal process
to benefit themselves. This prospect, in turn, encourages groups to
206
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lobby law enforcement agents for selective enforcement. The costs of
unfettered prosecutorial behavior could very plausibly be large enough
to justify pro-defendant procedural protections.
Approaching criminal procedure from the perspective of constraining self-interested actors is likely to provide important insights into
the current scope of criminal procedure as well as insights about
whether certain doctrines should be extended or not. The analysis
here could be applied to other current topics, including the extension
of criminal procedural protections to civil suits brought by government agencies, concerns raised by the increasing criminalization of
conduct in the US, and reform proposals to abolish Double Jeopardy
20
and the right to a jury trial for serious crimes in the UK. 1
APPENDIX
1. Tobit Regression Analysis
Below we report the results of expanded corruption index regressions.
The new variables below are EDU1 = percentage of population (25 and
older in 1991) that has something less than a primary education only.
This includes those who have no education at all or have completed
primary school but have gone no further. (Source: Statistical Abstract
of the World, 3d. ed., Annmarie Muth, ed., Gale Research (1997);
RELC = percentage of the population who are Catholic, RELM = percentage of the population who are Muslim or Islamic (Source: Statistical Abstract, and where necessary supplemented from http://www
.adherents.com/). ETM = dummy equal to one if economy is classified
as mixed socialist-capitalist, ETS = dummy equal to one if economy
is classified as socialist (Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/indexgeo.html).
Since the dependant (CPI) cannot be greater than 10 or less than 1,
we used the "Tobit" regression model. The coefficient estimates in
the Tobit regression were virtually indistinguishable from the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates. This is not surprising, since
almost all of our dependent variable observations were within the
limits of 1 and 10.
To facilitate comparisons among the different regression results reported in this section, the next table shows a tobit regression using a
few new variables. We also replaced RATIO with RATIO2, which is
the World Bank's measure of the general government consumption
101 See Andra Varin, In UK., Double Jeopardy'sin Jeopardy,http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/world/DailyNews/britainjustice02O8Ol .html.
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as a percentage of GDP in 1997. The variable GNPCAP measures per
capita GNP in 1995.
Table A.1.

Tobit Regressions

CPI

Coef.

t

Coef.

t

RATIO
CRUPUN3
CRUPUN2
COMMLAW
EDU1
RELC
RELM
ETM
ETS
CONS

.044
-1.889
-1.761
1.167
-. 028
-. 009
-. 006
-. 812
-1.668
7.091

1.69
-3.04
-2.80
2.17
-2.26
-1.30
-0.61
-1.45
-2.36
7.19

.047
-2.515
-2.146
.904

2.05
-4.61
-3.85
1.83

-. 014
-. 012
-. 408
-1.619
5.868

-2.19
-1.48
-0.81
-2.56
7.80

Table A.2.

75
.16

61
.16

Number
Pseudo R-squared
Tobit Regression

CPI

Coef.

St. Err.

T

P > It

RATIO2
GNPCAP
CRUPUN3
CRUPUN2
COMMLAW
RELC
RELM
ETM
ETS
CONS

.116
.000
-2.309
-1.689
.801
-. 012
-. 009
.028
-1.370
4.607

.035
.000
.489
.549
.465
.006
.007
.435
.584
.758

3.30
1.78
-4.72
-3.07
1.72
-1.96
-1.19
-0.06
-2.34
6.08

.002
.080
.000
-3.85
.090
.055
.239
.949
.022
.000

Number
Pseudo R-squared

74
.19

2. Instrumental Variables Regressions

We collapsed the two cruel and unusual punishment indexes (Crupun2
and Crupun3) into one (Crupun), which takes the value 1 (prohibition
of cruel punishment), 2 (prohibition but imperfect compliance), or
3 (no prohibition). As reported in the text, Table A.3 uses Mauro's
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index from 1961 as an instrument
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for Crupun. Table A.4 presents ordinary-least-squares regressions for
comparison.
Table A.3.

Instrumental Variables Regressions

CPI

Coef.

t

Coef.

t

RATIO2
GNPCAP
CRUPUN
COMMLAW
EDU1
RELC
RELM
ETM
ETS
CONS

.092
-. 000
-4.219
2.012
-. 005
.005
.043
.195
-. 381
10.987

0.90
-0.43
-1.76
1.64
-0.16
0.30
1.21
0.17
-0.24
3.56

.010
-. 000
-4.660
2.281

0.10
-0.41
-2.00
1.69

.003
.037
.274
-. 724
12.768

0.16
1.10
0.28
-0.55
2.61

Number
F statistic for regression
Prob > F

53
2.37
0.0283

Table A.4.

66
2.67
0.0146

Ordinary Least Squares Regressions

CPI

Coef.

t

Coef.

t

RATIO2
GNPCAP
CRUPUN
COMMLAW
EDU1
RELC
RELM
ETM
ETS
CONS

.108
.000
-. 832
1.070
-. 029
-. 005
.000
-. 368
-1.389
6.641

2.23
1.51
-2.74
2.03
-2.33
-0.83
0.03
-0.70
-2.01
6.22

.112
.000
-1.177
.882

3.00
1.70
-4.53
1.80

-. 011
-. 007
.084
-1.303
5.656

-1.71
-0.93
0.18
-2.11
6.17

Number
R-squared
F statistic for regression
Prob > F

60
0.61
8.72
0.0000

74
0.58
11.36
0.0000

